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              Bad Faith Exception to Prosecutorial Immunity for Brady Violations 
                         By Bennett L. Gershman 
Introduction – Imbler v. Pachtman 34 Years After 
 For those of us who teach and write about the conduct of prosecutors, reading 
Imbler v. Pachtman1 34 years after is a profoundly disturbing experience. Imbler is the 
linchpin for the doctrine that affords prosecutors absolute immunity from civil liability 
for actions that violate a defendant’s constitutional rights. Despite its revisionist history 
and dubious policy, Imbler is one of the Supreme Court’s most durable precedents, 
having been reaffirmed several times,2 and as recently as last Term.3  The Court in 
Imbler viewed the prosecutor as a “quasi-judicial” official, much like a judge or a grand
juror, for whom absolute immunity is vital to protect the judicial process from harassmen
and intimidation.
 
t 
vil 
                                                
4 Thus, according to Imbler, when a prosecutor initiates a prosecution 
and pursues a criminal case, the prosecutor is cloaked with absolute immunity from ci
liability to allow the prosecutor to make discretionary decisions fairly and fearlessly 
 
1 424 U.S. 409 (1976). 
2 See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (1997)(prosecutor protected by absolute immunity for preparing and 
filing charging documents but not entitled to absolute immunity for execution of certification for 
determination of probable cause); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993)(prosecutor not entitled to 
absolute immunity in investigating whether boot print at scene of crime was left by suspect and not entitled 
to absolute immunity for allegedly false statements made during press conference);  Burns v. Reed, 500 
U.S. 478 (1991)(prosecutor absolutely immune for participation in probable cause hearing but not entitled 
to absolute immunity for giving legal advice to police). 
3 See Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. 855 (2009)(absolute immunity applies to administrative 
functions of District Attorney and chief supervisory prosecutor for allegedly failing to institute supervision 
and training programs for assistants). See also Pottawattamie County, Iowa v. McGhee, 547 F.3d 922 (8th 
Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2002 (2009)(Court hears oral arguments on whether prosecutors who 
allegedly procured false testimony from witnesses during murder investigation and introduced false 
testimony at trial that resulted in defendants wrongful convictions and incarceration for nearly 20 years are 
entitled to absolute immunity), cert. dismissed,  2010 WL 6917 (Mem.) U.S. 2010. See Warren Richey, 
Supreme Court Drops Key Case on Limits of Immunity for Prosecutors, Christian Science Monitor, January 
4, 2010 (parties agree to end case in $12 million settlement). 
4 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423-429. 
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without the distraction of a flood of civil lawsuits by disgruntled and resentful 
defendants.5 The Court acknowledged the hard choice between the evils inherent in either 
alternative but, quoting Judge Learned Hand, concluded that it is “in the end better to 
leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to 
do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation.”6 
As an open question 34 years ago, Imbler’s choice to afford prosecutors absolute 
immunity for advocacy functions was not entirely unreasonable. Although the Court had 
to invent a specially-tailored common law history for absolute immunity, and had to 
concoct a public policy to spare prosecutors from having to defend civil lawsuits, 
Imbler’s accommodation is not without justification contextually. Civil rights litigation 
thirty-four years ago was much less hospitable to prosecutors; qualified immunity was 
not nearly as protective of prosecutors as it is today.7 Moreover, alternative sanctions for 
misconduct, such as criminal prosecution and professional discipline, were not clearly 
unavailable or ineffective; the Court was making an educated guess that these checks 
might serve as an effective deterrent to misconduct.8 Further, the Court’s attempt to 
classify a prosecutor’s conduct into functional categories such as advocacy, investigation, 
and administration, while not seamless and easily applied, seemed rational, and in any 
event, as the Court acknowledged, may present close questions requiring line-drawing in 
future cases.9 Most importantly, however, the Court did not discuss the larger problem of 
prosecutorial misconduct, particularly as it relates to the prosecutor’s duty to disclose 
                                                 
5 Id. at 423-426. 
6 Id. at 428, quoting Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396, 404 (2d Cir. 1926)(L. Hand, J.). 
7 See infra notes 185-190, and accompanying text. 
8 See infra notes 152-184, and accompanying text. 
9 See 424 U.S. at 431 n. 33. 
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exculpatory evidence; the subject was not nearly as complex and controversial as it is 
today.10   
Thus, as the edifice for the doctrine that has spawned hundreds of decisions 
immunizing prosecutors from civil liability for acts of willful misconduct – misconduct 
that occasionally resulted in innocent defendants being convicted and punished11 – 
Imbler appears in retrospect to have been a gratuitous experiment in judicial 
administration that not only failed to protect the judicial process but in fact skewed the 
balance of power in the criminal justice system more heavily toward prosecutors.12 
Moreover, by removing a deterrent to abuse of power by prosecutors, Imbler encouraged
dishonest prosecutors to hit below the belt, and discouraged honest prosecutors fro
doing the right thing. Although Imbler’s perverse analysis of incentives and disince
applies to the conduct of prosecutors across the board, there is one area of prosecutorial 
misconduct in which Imbler’s adoption of absolute immunity for prosecutors applies with 
special force -- the prosecutor’s decision to conceal from a defendant exculpatory 
evidence that in some cases could be used to prove the defendant’s innocence.  Tha
the subject of this Article: whether prosecutors should enjoy absolute immunity from
civil liability for deliberately suppressing exculpatory evidence, or whether the Su
Court, or Congress, should create an exception to absolute immunity for the deliberate 
suppression of exculpator
 
m 
ntives 
t is 
 
preme 
y evidence. 
                                                 
10 See infra Part III. 
11 See infra note 137, and accompanying text. 
12 Several commentators have proposed abolishing absolute prosecutorial immunity entirely. See Malia N. 
Brink, A Pendulum Swung Too Far: Why the Supreme Court Must Place Limits on Prosecutorial Immunity, 
4 CHAR. L. REV. 1 (2009); Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 2005 
B.Y.U.L. REV. 53 (2005); Douglas J. McNamara, Buckley, Imbler and Stare Decisis: The Present 
Predicament of Prosecutorial Immunity and an End to its Absolute Means, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1135 (1996). 
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Part I of this Article discusses Imbler’s adoption of absolute immunity for 
prosecutors. Part II discusses Imbler’s extentsion of absolute immunity to a prosecutor’s 
violation of his disclosure duty under Brady v. Maryland.13 Part III describes the ease 
with which prosecutors are able to evade the Brady rule and the difficulty of enforcing 
compliance with Brady. Part IV discusses the absence of any meaningful sanctions to 
deter and punish prosecutors for willful violations of Brady. Part V proposes a bad faith 
exception to absolute immunity of prosecutors for Brady violations. 
 
I. Imbler’s Adoption of Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity 
 Paul Imbler was convicted in 1961 of robbing and murdering Morris Hasson, the 
operator of a market in Los Angeles, California, and was sentenced to death.14 The 
prosecution’s key witness was Alfred Costello, who positively identified Imbler as the 
gunman.15 Imbler raised an alibi defense.16 After the state supreme court affirmed the 
conviction and sentence, the trial prosecutor, Deputy District Attorney Richard 
Pachtman, wrote to the Governor of California describing new witnesses who 
corroborated Imbler’s alibi as well as new evidence that undermined Costello’s 
credibility.17 Imbler thereupon filed a state habeas corpus petition based on this new 
                                                 
13 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
14 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 411-412. An alleged accomplice in the Hasson killing, Leonard Lingo, was himself 
killed  ten days later while attempting a robbery in Pomona, California. A subsequent investigation led by 
the Los Angeles District Attorney determined that Lingo was involved in the Hassson killing and that 
Imbler killed Hasson.   
15 Id. at 412. The prosecution also introduced several other eyewitnesses whose testimony supported 
Costello.  
16 Id. Imbler claimed to have spent the night of the killing bar-hopping with several persons and that he met 
Lingo for the first time the morning before the Pomona robbery. A witness corroborated his alibi. 
17 Id. Pachtman’s letter described newly discovered corroborating witnesses for Imbler’s alibi as well as 
new revelations about Costello’s background which indicated he was less trustworthy than he had 
represented originally to Pachtman and in his testimony. The letter was dated August 17, 1962. Imbler’s 
execution, which was originally scheduled for September 12, 1962, was stayed. 
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evidence but after a hearing, the writ was denied,18 although for unrelated reasons, 
Imbler’s death sentence was overturned.19 A few years later Imbler filed a federal habeas 
corpus petition raising the same grounds that were rejected by the state court.20 Deciding 
the petition on the written record without holding a hearing, the federal district court 
found eight instances of misconduct at Imbler’s trial whose cumulative effect warranted 
issuance of the writ.21 
 According to the district court, the misconduct consisted of six instances during 
Costello’s testimony in which the prosecutor elicited false and misleading testimony from 
Costello about his criminal background, his education, and his current income.22 
Although Pachtman lacked actual knowledge of the falsity, according to the district court, 
he had “cause to suspect” it.23 The other two instances of misconduct were suppressions 
of evidence by a police fingerprint expert who testified at the trial,24 and by a police 
investigator who had altered an artist’s sketch to resemble Imbler more closely.25 The 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed,26 finding that the district court had merely 
                                                 
18 Id. at 413. A referee was appointed to conduct the hearing at which Costello was the “main attraction.” 
He recanted his trial identification of Imbler and admitted embellishing his background during his trial 
testimony. The corroborating witnesses uncovered by Pachtman also testified. Imbler’s counsel described 
Pachtman’s post-trial investigation as “in the highest tradition of law enforcement and justice” and a 
premier example of “devotion to duty.” But he also charged that Pachtman had knowingly used Costello’s 
false testimony at Imbler’s trial. In a thorough opinion by Justice Roger Traynor, the California Supreme 
Court unanimously rejected these contentions and denied the writ. See In re Imbler, 387 P.2d 6 (Cal. 1963). 
The California court agreed with the referee’s finding that Costello’s recantation lacked credibility 
compared to his original identification, and that the new corroborating witnesses who testified at the 
hearing were unreliable. Id. at 10-14.   
19 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 414.  
20 Id. 
21 See Imbler v. Craven, 298 F. Supp. 795, 812 (C.D.Cal. 1969). 
22  Imbler, 424 U.S. at 415 n. 8 (referring to district court’s finding that Costello had “lied flatly” about his 
criminal record, education, and current income). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 415. 
25 Id. 
26 Imbler v. California, 424 F.2d 631, 632 (9th Cir. 1970).  
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reached different conclusions than the state court in applying federal constitutional 
standards to the facts. The state chose not to retry Imbler and he was released.27 
 Imbler thereafter filed a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 
Pachtman and various officers of the Los Angeles police department alleging a 
conspiracy to deprive him of his liberty in violation of due process.28 Imbler’s complaint 
essentially tracked the district court’s opinion in alleging that Pachtman, intentionally and 
negligently, allowed Costello to give false testimony; that Pachtman was chargeable with 
the fingerprint expert’s suppression; that Pachtman knew that a lie detector test had 
cleared Imbler; and that Pachtman had used at trial the altered artist’s sketch.29 The 
district court granted Pachtman’s motion to dismiss the complaint,30 holding that public 
prosecutors repeatedly had been afforded immunity from civil liability for “acts done as 
part of their traditional official functions.” The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed, finding that Pachtman’s acts were committed during prosecutorial activities that 
were “an integral part of the judicial process.”31                   
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the “important and recurring 
issue” of prosecutorial liability under § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.32 The Court 
acknowledged at the outset that Section 1983, the statutory remedy for the deprivation of 
constitutional rights caused by an official’s abuse of power,33 contains no immunities for 
                                                 
27 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 415. 
28 Id. at 415-416. 
29 Id. at 416. 
30 Id. 
31 Imbler v. Pachtman, 500 F.2d 1301, 1302 (9th Cir. 1974), quoting Marlowe v. Coakley, 404 F.2d 70 (9th 
Cir. 1968).  
32 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 417.  
33 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961). 42 U.S.C. § 1983, originally enacted as part of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1971,  states:  
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any 
State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other 
 6
prosecutors.34 However, the Supreme Court assumed that Congress did not intend to 
abrogate all of the immunities that existed at common law, and the Court identified those 
immunities that were available for certain parties at common law.35 Thus, according to 
the Court, absolute immunity was available at common law for judges,36 legislators,37 
grand jurors,38 and other government officials such as assessors, highway officers, and 
members of township boards.39 In addition, absolute immunity, referred to as 
“defamation immunity,” also was available to any person for statements that were made 
in the course of judicial proceedings.40 However, absolute immunity was not afforded to 
other government officials, only a qualified immunity, referred to at common law as 
                                                                                                                                                 
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in 
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” 
34 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 417. Indeed, in 1871, when Section 1983 was enacted, public prosecutors did not 
exist in their modern form and criminal prosecutions ordinarily were instituted by private citizens.. See 
Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. at 132 (Scalia, J., concurring)(noting that at common law private citizens 
typically performed the functions currently delegated to public prosecutors); Burns v. Reed 500 U.S. at 500  
(Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting)(noting that “prosecutorial functions, had they existed in their modern 
form in 1871, would have been considered quasi-judicial”). It was 25 years later that a state court would 
address for the first time a prosecutor’s immunity from civil liability. See Griffith v. Slinkard, 44 N.E. 1001 
(Ind. 1896)(holding prosecutor absolutely immune in civil action alleging that prosecutor maliciously and 
without probable cause added plaintiff’s name to grand jury true bill after grand jury refused to indict 
plaintiff and which resulted in plaintiff’s arrest and incarceration). 
35 Imbler , 424 U.S. at 417-419. The Court cited Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951), for the 
conclusion that immunities “well grounded in history and reason” had not been abrogated “by covert 
inclusion in the general language” of section 1983.   
36 Id. at 418, 423 n. 20 (“The immunity of a judge for acts within his jurisdiction has roots extending to the 
earliest days of the common law.”). 
37 Id. at 418, noting that “regardless of any unworthy purpose animating their actions, legislators were held 
to enjoy under this statute their usual immunity when acting ‘in a field where legislators traditionally have 
power to act,’” quoting Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. at 379.   
38 Id. at 423 n. 20 (noting that the immunity of grand jurors enjoys “an almost equally venerable common 
law tenet” as judges). 
39 For discussion of these immunities, see Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. at 499 (Scalia, J., concurring and 
dissenting). According to Justice Scalia, “prosecutorial functions, had they existed in their modern form in 
1871, would have been considered quasi-judicial (wherefore they are entitled to qualified immunity under § 
1983).” Id. (emphasis in original). 
40 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 426 n. 23 (“In the law of defamation, a concern for the airing of all evidence has 
resulted in an absolute privilege for any courtroom statement relevant to the subject matter of the 
proceeding. In the case of lawyers the privilege extends to their briefs and pleadings as well.”).  
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“quasi-judicial immunity.”41 Qualified immunity was available to government officials 
such as governors,42 other executive branch officials,43 and police officers.44  
With respect to a prosecutor’s immunity at common law, Imbler concluded, as 
had several lower courts, that it is “well settled” that a prosecutor enjoyed absolute 
immunity when he acted within the scope of his prosecutorial duties.45 To be sure, 
prosecutors are members of the executive branch, and as the Court noted, executive 
branch officials such as governors and police officers at common law received only 
qualified immunity.46 Moreover, Imbler referred to a prosecutor as a “quasi-judicial” 
official, and at common law, absolute immunity was not available to quasi-judicial 
officials.47 Nonetheless, Imbler emphasized the prosecutor’s “functional comparability” 
to judges and grand jurors to the extent that all of these parties make discretionary 
decisions on the basis of evidence presented to them in court.48 Thus, despite some 
analytical gaps and inconsistencies, Imbler was able to extrapolate from the common law 
two broad categories in which absolute immunity for prosecutors would be available; 
                                                 
41 Id. at 420, 423 n. 20 (referring to grand jurors and prosecutors as “quasi-judicial” officers); Burns v. 
Reed, 500 U.S. at 500 (noting that quasi-judicial immunity afforded an official only qualified 
immunity)(Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting);  Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. at 132 (noting that at 
common law, the discretionary decisions of  public officials that did not involve actual adjudication were 
protected by “quasi-judicial” immunity, and is “more akin to what we now call ‘qualified,’ rather than 
absolute immunity”)(Scalia, J., concurring). 
42 Imbler, 424 U.S. at  419. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). 
43 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 419. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. at 247. 
44 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 418. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555-557 (1967).  
45 Id. at 424, 424 n. 21 (citing cases)..  
46 Id. at 418-419. 
47 See supra note 41, and accompanying text. 
48 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423 n. 20. (“Courts that have extended the same immunity to the prosecutor have 
sometimes remarked on the fact that all three officials judge, grand juror, and prosecutor exercise a 
discretionary judgment on the basis of the evidence presented to them…It is the functional comparability of 
their judgments to those of the judge that has resulted in both grand jurors and prosecutors being referred to 
as ‘quasi-judicial’ officers, and their immunities being termed ‘quasi-judicial’ as well.”).” 
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first, suits for malicious prosecution,49 and second, suits alleging courtroom misconduct 
that involves the examination of witnesses and arguments to the jury.50 
Imbler, however, extended a prosecutor’s absolute immunity beyond these two 
categories. Relying on public policy, Imbler reasoned that if a prosecutor was constrained 
in making “every decision” by the threat of a civil lawsuit, the public trust in the 
prosecutor’s office might be compromised.51 Imbler speculated that lawsuits against 
prosecutors could be expected “with some frequency,”52 and that the prosecutor’s energy 
and attention to his work as a consequence would be diverted.53 Imbler further argued, 
but did not elaborate, that affording prosecutors only qualified immunity would have an 
adverse effect on the criminal justice system because a prosecutor would face “greater 
difficulty” in meeting the standard of qualified immunity than other executive or 
administrative officials.54 Moreover, according to Imbler, a prosecutor might be 
discouraged from presenting evidence whose accuracy might be questionable, or making 
arguments about that evidence, if the use of and arguments about that evidence exposed 
him to personal liability.55 In sum, according to Imbler, “the ultimate fairness of the 
                                                 
49 Id. at 422-424.  
50 Id. at 426 n. 23. 
51 Id. at 424-425 (“A prosecutor is duty bound to exercise his best judgment both in deciding which suits to 
bring and in conducting them in court. The public trust of the prosecutor’s office would suffer if he were 
constrained in making every decision by the consequences in terms of his own potential liability in a suit 
for damages.”). 
52 Id. at 425. 
53 Id. (“if the prosecutor could be made to answer in court each time such a person charged him with 
wrongdoing, his energy and attention would be diverted from the pressing duty of enforcing the criminal 
law”). 
54 Id. (“It is fair to say, we think, that the honest prosecutor would face greater difficulty in meeting the 
standards of qualified immunity than other executive or administrative officials.”). The Court noted that 
prosecutors operate under “serious constraints of time and even information,” but did not explain why other 
executive and administrative officials who receive qualified immunity but who operate under similar 
constraints would not face the same burdens as prosecutors). 
55 Id. at 426 (noting that veracity of witnesses in criminal cases “frequently is subject to doubt,” and “[i]f 
prosecutors were hampered in exercising their judgment as to the use of such witnesses by concern about 
resulting personal liability, the triers of fact in criminal cases often would be denied relevant evidence”).  
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operation of the system itself would be weakened by subjecting prosecutors to §1983 
liability.”56 
Although Imbler recognized that a genuinely wronged defendant would be 
without a civil remedy against a malicious and dishonest prosecutor, Imbler believed that 
the alternative would disserve the broader public interest.57 In fact, Imbler surmised that a 
defendant might actually be prejudiced if he was able to pursue a § 1983 lawsuit against a 
prosecutor because a court that reviewed the prosecutor’s conduct might skew its 
decision to protect the prosecutor from potential civil liability.58 Moreover, Imbler 
asserted, alternative sanctions to civil lawsuits against prosecutors were available to deter 
a prosecutor’s malicious and dishonest behavior. Indeed, the availability of bringing 
criminal charges against a prosecutor,59 as well as the availability of professional 
discipline by bar associations,60 would “not leave the public powerless.”61  “These 
checks,” said the Court, “undermine the argument that the imposition of civil liability is 
the only way to insure that prosecutors are mindful of the constitutional rights of persons 
accused of crime.”62 
The scope of the absolute immunity that Imbler afforded prosecutors was not 
demarcated precisely. Imbler used various formulations to describe the extent of a 
prosecutor’s immunity, stating that absolute immunity would be available for prosecutors 
                                                 
56 Id. at 427. 
57 See supra note 6, and accompanying text. 
58 Id. at 428 (qualifying a prosecutor’s immunity “often would prejudice defendants in criminal cases by 
skewing post-conviction judicial decisions that should be made with the sole purpose of insuring justice”);  
and 428 n. 27 (“consideration of the habeas petition could well be colored by an awareness of potential 
prosecutorial liability”). 
59 Id. at 429. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
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in “initiating a prosecution,”63 “presenting the state’s case,”64 performing activities that 
are “an integral part of the judicial process,”65 performing activities that are “intimately 
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,”66 and performing functions as 
an “advocate,”67 although noting that an advocate’s duties may also include actions 
preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution as well as actions outside the courtroom.68 
Imbler cautioned that absolute immunity would not necessarily be afforded to prosecutors 
for administrative and investigative activities, and concluded that “[d]rawing a proper 
line between these functions may present difficult questions, but this case does not 
require us to anticipate them.”69 
 
II. Imbler’s Application to Brady Violations 
Imbler did not explicitly address whether absolute immunity extends to a 
prosecutor who violates his constitutional duty to disclose material exculpatory evidence 
to a defendant under Brady v. Maryland.70 Imbler’s lawsuit against Pachtman was based 
almost entirely on allegations that Pachtman knowingly allowed a key eyewitness at 
                                                 
63 Id. at 431; Id. at 421 
64 Id. at 431. 
65 Id. at 430, quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 500 F.2d at 1302 
66 Id. at 430. 
67 Id. at 431; Id. at 431 n. 33. 
68 Id. at 431 n. 33. 
69 Id. The Supreme Court has not decided whether absolute immunity extends to a prosecutor’s post-
conviction functions, such as prosecuting an appeal, opposing habeas petitions, or reviewing newly 
discovered evidence.  Circuit Courts of Appeal have reached different conclusions. Compare Warney v. 
Monroe County, 587 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2009)(prosecutors entitled to absolute immunity for post-conviction 
review and  testing of DNA evidence), and Carter v. Burch, 34 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 1994)(absolute immunity 
for handling direct appeal and post-conviction motions) with Yarris v. County of Delaware, 465 F.3d 129 
(3d Cir. 2006)(no absolute immunity unless prosecutor personally involved as state’s advocate in post-
conviction proceedings) and  Houston v. Partee, 978 F.2d 362 (7th Cir. 1992)(no absolute immunity where 
prosecutor did not personally prosecute appeal). For a discussion on prosecutorial conduct in the post-
conviction context, see Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction 
Claims of Innocence,  84 B.U.L. REV. 125 (2004)(explaining prosecutorial resistance to post-conviction 
claims of innocence as attributable to personal incentives to maintaining convictions, logistical barriers to 
confronting innocence claims, and political consequences in responding to such claims). 
70 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
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Imbler’s capital murder trial to testify falsely without correcting that testimony.71 Imbler 
included counts charging suppression of evidence by the police, and claimed that 
Pachtman was responsible for that suppression vicariously.72 The Supreme Court 
discussed Imbler’s Brady claim in a lengthy footnote at the end of its opinion largely in 
response to Justice White’s concurring opinion in which he argued against extending 
absolute immunity to Brady violations.73  
In his concurring opinion, Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan and 
Marshall, did not disagree that absolute immunity would be appropriate when a 
prosecutor is sued civilly for knowingly eliciting and using false testimony to prove a 
defendant’s guilt. Justice White drew this conclusion based on his understanding that a 
prosecutor’s absolute immunity at common law extended to two kinds of lawsuits – suits 
for malicious prosecution,74 and suits for defamatory remarks made during judicial 
proceedings.75 As to the immunity for malicious prosecution, Justice White observed that 
this immunity was necessary to protect the judicial process because absent immunity, 
prosecutors might be afraid to bring proper charges against a defendant for fear of being 
sued if the defendant was acquitted.76 As to the immunity for statements made in court, 
Justice White observed that this immunity was also necessary to protect the judicial 
process by encouraging those persons involved in judicial proceedings to make complete 
                                                 
71 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 416. 
72 Id. 
73 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n. 34. 
74 Id. at 438 (“I agree with the majority that, with respect to suits based on claims that the prosecutor’s 
decision was malicious, and without probable cause…the judicial process is better served by absolute 
immunity than by any other rule.”). 
75 Id. at 440 (noting that function of judicial proceeding is “to determine where the truth lies,” and those 
parties involved in judicial proceedings should be encouraged to make full disclosure of all relevant 
information). 
76 Id. at 438 (“If suits for malicious prosecution were permitted, the prosecutor’s incentive would always be 
not to bring charges.”). 
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and candid disclosures of all relevant information without fear of being sued for false and 
defamatory testimony and arguments.77 Indeed, Justice White observed, it is precisely the 
function of a judicial proceeding to determine the truth, and since it is often impossible 
for attorneys to be absolutely certain of objective truth and falsity, a prosecutor should be 
given every incentive to submit the testimony of witnesses to the crucible of the judicial 
process without being subjected to liability based on the claim that he knew or should 
have known that the testimony of the witness was false.78 
However, according to Justice White, the majority extended to prosecutors an 
immunity that was not available at common law -- immunity for the suppression of 
exculpatory evidence.79 Rather than protecting the judicial process, according to Justice 
White, affording a prosecutor absolute immunity for such conduct in fact undermines the 
judicial process by removing an incentive to prosecutors to disclose material evidence 
that is favorable to the defendant.80 Accusing the majority of an illogical extension of 
immunity, Justice White explained that whereas it is sensible to afford defamation 
immunity to prosecutors to encourage prosecutors to elicit all relevant information to 
assist the fact-finder in arriving at the truth, “it would stand this immunity rule on its 
head” to apply it to a prosecutor who withholds relevant information from the fact-finder 
and thereby prevents the fact-finder from arriving at the truth.81 Thus, according to 
                                                 
77 Id. at 439. 
78 Id. at 440 (“I agree with the majority that history and policy support an absolute immunity for 
prosecutors from suits based solely on claims that they knew or should have known that the testimony of a 
witness called by the prosecution was false.”). Justice White appended a clarifying footnote that absolute 
immunity should not apply to independent claims that the prosecutor withheld facts demonstrating the 
falsity of the witness’s testimony in constitutionally material respects. Id. at  440 n. 5. 
79 Id. at 441 (“I disagree with any implication that the absolute immunity extends to suits charging  
unconstitutional suppression of evidence.”). 
80 Id. at 442 (“one would expect that the judicial process would be protected and indeed its integrity 
enhanced by denial of immunity to prosecutors who engage in unconstitutional conduct”). 
81 Id. at 442-443. 
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Justice White, immunizing a prosecutor for not disclosing exculpatory evidence to the 
defendant encourages nondisclosure and discourages disclosure.82 Denying immunity to 
a prosecutor for withholding evidence encourages disclosure and discourages
nondisclosure.
 
                                                
83 Justice White acknowledged that denying absolute immunity to a 
prosecutor for failing to disclose exculpatory evidence might encourage a prosecutor to 
disclose more evidence than Brady required.84 But such broader disclosure, Justice White 
argued, “would hardly injure the judicial process.”85 “Indeed, it will help it.”86 
Moreover, according to Justice White, constitutional violations that are committed 
by prosecutors in open court such as improper summations, introduction of hearsay 
testimony in violation of the Confrontation Clause, and knowingly presenting false 
testimony, clearly are integral parts of the judicial process,87 and suggested that such 
violations may be corrected by the judicial process. However, according to Justice White, 
there is no way that the judicial process can correct a prosecutor’s suppression of 
exculpatory evidence, for such conduct is hidden from the judicial process and the 
suppressed evidence may never be discovered.88 It is therefore all the more important to 
deter such violations by permitting § 1983 damage actions in those cases where 
violations are exposed, Justice White argued.89 “The stakes are high,” Justice White 
 
82 Id.  
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 443 (“A prosecutor seeking to protect himself from liability for failure to disclose evidence may be 
induced to disclose more than is required.”). 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 443. 
88 Id. at 443-444 (“the judicial process has no way to prevent or correct the constitutional violation of 
suppressing evidence [since] the judicial process will by definition be ignorant of the violation when it 
occurs; and it is reasonable to suspect that most such violations never surface.”). 
89 Id. at 444. 
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observed,90 citing Hilliard v. Williams,91 in which the prosecutor’s suppression of 
exculpatory evidence resulted in the conviction and punishment of an innocent defendant. 
The injury to the judicial process from allowing prosecutors to evade civil liability for 
such misconduct is easy to identify, according to Justice White.92 However, he added, it 
is “virtually impossible” to identify any injury to the judicial process from permitting 
such suits.93 
In its Brady footnote, the majority saw no difference in principle between a 
prosecutor knowingly presenting false testimony and a prosecutor suppressing evidence 
that would demonstrate that falsity. “The distinction is not susceptible of practical 
application,” the majority contended.94 Moreover, the majority argued, to require a 
prosecutor to make a ”full disclosure” of potentially exculpatory evidence to obtain 
absolute immunity would place upon the prosecutor a duty that might far exceed the 
disclosure requirements of Brady.95  Moreover, according to the majority, denying 
immunity to the prosecutor would “weaken the adversary system” as well as “interfere 
with the legitimate exercise of prosecutorial discretion.”96  
                                                 
90 Id. 
91 465 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1972)(no absolute immunity for prosecutor in civil complaint charging prosecutor 
with deliberate suppression of exculpatory evidence), cert. granted and decision vacated, 420 U.S. 945 
(1975), vacated on remand, 540 F.2d 220, 221 (6th Cir. 1976)(prosecutor absolutely immune from civil 
liability for suppressing exculpatory police report and instructing witness to testify falsely). 
92 Id. at 444-445. 
93 Id. at 444-445 (“Where the reason for the rule extending absolute immunity to prosecutors disappears, it 
would truly be ‘monstrous to deny recovery’”), citing Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949). 
94 Id. at 431 n. 34. (“A claim of using perjured testimony simply may be reframed and asserted as a claim of 
suppression of the evidence upon which the knowledge of perjury rested.”). 
95 Id.  
96 Id. The majority suggested that there was no principled distinction between a prosecutor knowingly using 
perjured testimony and knowingly suppressing information demonstrating the falsity. Id  (“As a matter of 
principle, we perceive no less an infringement of a defendant’s rights by the knowing use of perjured 
testimony than by the deliberate withholding of exculpatory information.”). However, the majority likely 
was aware that the distinction was neither unprincipled and nor abstract. Indeed, the Court would hear oral 
arguments the following month, and decide later that Term in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) 
that the distinction between a prosecutor’s knowing use of false testimony and a prosecutor’s suppression 
of exculpatory evidence were distinct violations. Moreover, in contrast to Imbler, the Court in Agurs 
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III. The Brady Rule – Easily Evaded and Virtually Unenforceable 
 Of all the constitutional rules in criminal procedure that impose limits on a 
prosecutor’s conduct, the rule of Brady v. Maryland97 is unique in many ways. In all 
other areas of criminal procedure a prosecutor is commanded by the constitution, statutes, 
and ethics rules to refrain from striking foul blows.98 Brady alone imposes on the 
prosecutor a positive duty of fairness. By tempering the prosecutor’s traditional role of a 
zealous advocate with that of a neutral minister of justice, Brady promised to transform 
the U.S. criminal adversary system from a competitive sporting event into a more 
balanced and objective search for the truth. 99 As the Court in Brady observed: “[S]ociety 
wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system 
                                                                                                                                                 
described the prosecutor’s duty to disclose exculpatory evidence as grounded in elementary notions of 
fairness to serve the cause of justice rather than as a function of a prosecutor’s role as an advocate seeking 
to win a conviction. Id. at 111 (noting “prosecutor’s obligation to serve the cause of justice”).. 
97 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
98 See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)(although prosecutor “may strike hard blows, he 
is not at liberty to strike foul ones”); United States v. Myerson, 18 F.3d 153, 162 n. 10 (2d Cir. 
1994)(prosecutor has “special duty not to mislead”). 
99 The prosecutor’s Brady duty is contained in FED.R.CRIM. P. R. 16(a)(1)(E)(i)(upon a defendant’s 
request, prosecutor must disclose evidence if  “the item is material to preparing the defense”).  There are 
widely inconsistent approaches in the U.S. courts at to what constitutes Brady evidence, the specific types 
of information required to be disclosed, when it must be disclosed, and the sanctions for noncompliance. 
See Treatment of Brady v. Maryland Material in United States District and State Courts’ Rules, Orders, 
and Policies, REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL RULES OF THE 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, (Federal Judicial Center 2004). Rule 16 does not 
explicitly require a prosecutor to disclose all exculpatory information to the defense. In 2006, the Advisory 
Committee on the Rules of Criminal Procedure voted eight to four to forward an amendment to the 
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure recommending an amendment to Rule 16 
requiring a prosecutor to disclose to the defense all exculpatory information. See 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/CR09-2006-min.pdf. The Department of Justice strongly opposed 
the amendment and argued that changes in the United States Attorneys Manual dealing for the first time 
with a prosecutor’s disclosure obligations and establishing guidelines for disclosure would make such an 
amendment unnecessary. See 
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/5mcrm.htm. But see United States v. 
Jones, 620 F. Supp.2d 163, 171 (D. Mass. 2009)(change in U.S. Attorneys Manual “was not an unprompted 
effort by the Department of Justice to address a problem that it perceived and acknowledged. Rather, it was 
part of an ardent and, to date, successful effort of the Department to defeat a possible amendment to the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.”). 
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of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.”100 Further, 
in all other areas of constitutional criminal procedure in which an error has prejudiced a 
defendant, it is typically the prosecution that bears the burden of proving that the error 
was harmless.101 Under Brady, however, it is the defendant who bears the burden to 
establish that the prosecution’s suppression of favorable evidence was harmful.102 Also, 
in all other areas of constitutional criminal procedure, the commission of a constitutional 
error – and a prosecutor’s suppression of evidence under Brady violates due process – 
requires the prosecution to meet a much more stringent burden by proving that there is no 
reasonable possibility that the violation would have altered the verdict.103 Under Brady, 
however, the defendant must prove that had it not been for the prosecutor’s suppression, 
there is a reasonable probability that the jury’s verdict would have been different.104 A 
reasonable probability, according to the Court, is a probability “sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome.”105 
However, rather than producing a fundamental change in the criminal justice 
system, Brady has become an illusory protection that is easily evaded and virtually 
                                                 
100 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.  Brady elaborated on this theme, alluding to the inscription on the walls of the 
Justice Department: “The United States wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens in the courts.” 
Id.  
101 See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)(harmless error rule “put[s] the burden on the 
beneficiary of the error either to prove that there was no injury or to suffer a reversal of his erroneously 
obtained judgment”). 
102 See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 685 (1985)(White, J., concurring)(“I agree with the Court 
that respondent is not entitled to have his conviction overturned unless he can show that the evidence 
withheld by the Government was ‘material’”); id. at 701 (Marshall, J,, dissenting)(criticizing standard that 
requires defendant to “shoulder the heavy burden of proving how [the undisclosed evidence] would have 
affected the outcome”).  
103 See Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963)(“The question is whether there is a reasonable 
possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.”); Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. at 24 (“There is little, if any, difference between our statement in Fahy v. State of 
Connecticut about ‘whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have 
contributed to the conviction’ and requiring the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.”).   
104 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (“The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the 
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”). 
105 Id. 
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unenforceable.106 Brady represents a contradiction to the operation of the U.S. criminal 
adversary system. The prosecutor, on the one hand, is encouraged to be a zealous 
advocate charged with the responsibility of winning convictions against people who 
break the law, but at the same time is encouraged to be a neutral minister of justice with 
the duty to provide the defendant with exculpatory evidence that might assist the 
defendant in obtaining an acquittal.107 Although Brady does not require a prosecutor to 
provide the defense with open-ended discovery,108 Brady does require the prosecutor to 
sift through his files in a conscientious effort to identify any favorable evidence that 
might assist a defendant in proving his innocence. Given “this obviously unharmonious 
role” for a prosecutor,109 Brady exemplifies a remarkable faith by the Supreme Court in 
the capacity of prosecutors to subordinate their moral values, personal biases, and 
competitive instincts to the overriding objective of the pursuit of truth in the service of 
justice. For those prosecutors who “play the game to win,” as prosecutors typically do,110 
carefully analyzing the evidence, reexamining the hypothesis of guilt, and identifying 
                                                 
106 See Stephanos Bibas, Brady v. Maryland: From Adversarial Gamesmanship Toward the Search for 
Innocence? Chapter 4, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES (Carol S. Streiker ed. 2006), at 154 
(“Ultimately, though, our proceduralized adversarial model has rendered Brady, if not a dead letter, not a 
very vigorous one either. Judges are too weak, prosecutors are too partisan, enforcement is too difficult, 
discovery is too limited, and plea bargains are too widespread for Brady to influence many cases. Brady 
remains an important symbol but is some ways a hollow one.”). 
107 Id. at 696-697 (Marshall, J., dissenting)(“for purposes of Brady, the prosecutor must abandon his role as 
an advocate and pore through his files, as objectively as possible, to identify the material that could 
undermine his case”). 
108 See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)(prosecutor has “no duty to provide defense counsel 
with unlimited discovery”). But see Ellen S. Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalism of Prosecutors in 
Discretionary Decisions, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1511, 1522 (2000)(“Some defense attorneys are 
fortunate to practice in jurisdictions that have “open-file” discovery practices and thus receive the material 
early in the case.”).  
109 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 697 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
110 See Catherine Ferguson-Gilbert, It is Not Whether You Win or Lose, It is How You Play the Game: Is the 
Win-Loss Scorekeeping Mentality Doing Justice for Prosecutors? 38 CAL. W.L.REV. 283, 289-290 
(2001)(observing that prosecutors readily admit that winning is important and that District Attorneys 
Offices keep track of “batting averages” of prosecutors); Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial & 
Error: Break Rules, Be Promoted, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Jan. 14, 1999, at N1 (describing prosecutorial 
culture “where prosecutors recite conviction  rates like boxers touting win-loss records”). 
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defects and inconsistencies are undertaken not as a “minister of justice,”111 but as a 
zealous partisan who keeps score of his convictions, is motivated by the rewards of 
winning, and is unlikely to sacrifice the conviction of a guilty defendant to an abstract 
principle of justice. The Brady rule runs counter to these considerations. 
Moreover, Brady’s counter-intuitiveness is based not only on general observations 
of the interests and incentives of a prosecutor within the criminal adversary system; 
Brady-compliance also runs counter to more nuanced considerations of the psychology of 
a prosecutor as she prepares for adversarial combat. Any prosecutor preparing for trial 
undoubtedly believes the defendant to be guilty and has assembled a cache of evidence to 
prove the defendant’s guilt. Given the fact that that the prosecutor and the police have 
virtually total control of the evidence from the start of the investigation,112 there 
inevitably may be evidence in the government’s files that contradicts guilt and which 
might be viewed by a rational prosecutor as favorable to the defendant and subject to 
Brady disclosure. By the same token, however, a rational prosecutor who has carefully 
analyzed her proof in preparation for trial reasonably might view this contradictory 
evidence as irrelevant, unpersuasive, or unreliable and certainly not of such probative 
value to reach the high threshold of materiality that is required for disclosure under 
Brady.113 To be sure, a prosecutor has no discretion under Brady to refuse to search for 
                                                 
111 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY R. 3.8 comment 1 (1983) (“A 
prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.”); MODEL 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1981)(“The responsibility of a public 
prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict.”); ABA 
STANDARDS FOR CRIMNINAL JUSTICE, The Prosecution Function, Standard 3-1.2(c)(3d ed. 
1993)(“The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict.”); NATIONAL 
PROSECUTION STANDARDS 1.1 (2d ed. 1991)(“The primary responsibility of prosecution is to see that 
justice is accomplished.”). 
112 See Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor’s Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 309, 314 
(2001)(prosecutor enjoys  “virtual monopoly of the fact-finding process”).  
113 See infra notes 121-130, and accompanying text. 
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materially favorable evidence, but a prosecutor has unfettered discretion to decide 
whether any of that evidence must be disclosed. And given the mindset of prosecutors 
preparing for trial, it is very likely that prosecutors are predisposed to view their 
disclosure obligations quite narrowly.114 
 But leaving aside intuitive judgments about a prosecutor’s mental state and so-
called “conviction mentality,” it is becoming increasingly recognized by specialists in 
cognitive psychology that a prosecutor’s predisposition probably is to ignore Brady.  
Experts who have studied the existence and impact of various cognitive biases on 
prosecutors recognize that prosecutors ordinarily make professional decisions based on 
their personal beliefs, values, and incentives, and that these decisions may result in the 
subversion of justice, even unintentionally.115  These studies have examined the capacity 
of prosecutors to maintain their neutrality and objectivity that compliance with Brady 
requires, and have described the kinds of pressures and biases that operate on virtually all 
of the discretionary decisions that prosecutors make, including the ability to maintain an 
open mind that Brady-compliance requires.116 For instance, a prosecutor who is 
                                                 
114 See  Randolph N. Jonakait, The Ethical Prosecutor’s Misconduct, 23 CRIM. L. BULL. 550, 559 
(1977)(prosecutors are convinced the defendant is guilty and view contradictory evidence as “irrelevant or  
petty incongruity”); Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 685, 690 
n. 24 (2006)(citing anecdotal evidence confirming prosecutors’ restrictive view of Brady obligation). For a 
recent example of this prosecutorial mindset in a highly-publicized prosecution of a United States Senator, 
see United States v. Stevens, Cr. No. 08-231 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2009)(Hearing)(Docket No. 372) at 4-7 
(district judge identifies at least 12  instances where the prosecution team “was caught making false 
representations and not meeting its discovery obligations,” and as the court listed the violations, the court 
noted the government’s responses – “testimony was immaterial;” government acted in “good faith;” “just a 
mistake;” “mistaken understanding;” evidence was “immaterial;” nondisclosure was :”inadvertent;” 
nondisclosure was “unintentional;” documents were “immaterial;” complaint by FBI agent against 
prosecutors for their misconduct had “no relevancy” and could be adequately addressed by the Office of 
Professional Responsibility.). 
115 See Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 
2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 296-307 (describing case studies in tunnel vision by prosecutors that subverted 
justice). 
116 See Alafair  S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision-Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 
47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587 (2006)(describing prosecutorial decision-making as often “irrational” 
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convinced of a defendant’s guilt – and what prosecutor is not convinced -- may exhibit a 
so-called “tunnel vision” whereby she ignores, overlooks, or dismisses evidence that 
might be favorable to a defendant as being irrelevant, incredible, or unreliable.117 Similar 
kinds of cognitive biases that operate on a prosecutor’s decision-making include 
“confirmation bias” that credits evidence that confirms one’s theory of guilt, and 
discounts evidence that disconfirms that theory;118 “selective information processing,” 
that inclines one to weigh evidence that supports one’s belief in the defendant’s guilt 
more heavily than evidence that contradicts those beliefs; 119“belief perseverance,” that 
describes a tendency to adhere to one’s chosen theory even though new evidence comes 
to light that completely undercuts that theory’s evidentiary basis; 120and “avoidance of 
cognitive dissonance,” under which a person tends to adjust his or her beliefs to conform 
to their behavior.121 All of these biases plainly are impediments to rational decision-
making and make it perfectly understandable that a prosecutor, wearing the mantle of a 
zealous advocate seeking to win a conviction, would probably overestimate the strength 
of his case and underestimate the probative value of evidence that contradicts or 
undermines his case, and the latter evidence is precisely the kind of evidence that a 
prosecutor is required to identify and disclose under Brady.  
Finally, apart from the adversarial pressures on prosecutors that discourage 
Brady-compliance, compounded by the cognitive biases that make compliance even more 
unlikely, is the judiciary’s permissive interpretation of the prosecutor’s duty under Brady 
                                                                                                                                                 
because of cognitive biases). Having served as a prosecutor for several years, as well as being a long-time 
observer of prosecutorial conduct, I am inclined to agree with much of Professor Burke’s commentary). 
117 See Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One’s Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel Vision, 49 HOW. L. J. 475 
(2006); Findley & Scott, supra note 115. 
118 See Burke, supra note 14, at 1594-96. 
119 Id. at 1596-99. 
120 Id. at 1599-1602. 
121 Id. at 1601-02. 
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that affords prosecutors a virtual license to evade Brady with impunity. Brady, as 
originally understood, required a prosecutor to make a prospective, pretrial determination 
as to the probative value of certain evidence in his possession that might be materially 
favorable to the accused and to immediately disclose that evidence.122 However, this 
prospective duty of the prosecutor mutated into a retrospective, post-conviction 
determination by an appellate court as to whether the prosecutor’s nondisclosure, in the 
context of the entire record at trial, makes it reasonably probable that, had the evidence 
been disclosed, the defendant would have been found not guilty.123 By adopting this 
retrospective, post-trial standard to define the scope of the defendant’s constitutional right 
to certain evidence prior to trial,  the Court made it increasingly easy for prosecutors to 
evade their Brady duty simply by claiming that given the strength of their case, and the 
confidence they had in the quality of their evidence, they believed that it would be 
inconceivable that any evidence they possessed might reasonably be viewed as so 
favorable to the accused that it would be reasonably probable that with this evidence the 
defendant would be found not guilty. What rational prosecutor would ever reach such a 
                                                 
122 See United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 141 (2d Cir. 2001)(suggesting that Court in Brady “appears 
to be using the word ‘material’ in its evidentiary sense, i.e., evidence that has some probative tendency to 
preclude a finding of guilt or lessen punishment”). 
123 Bagley, 473 U.S.  699-700 (Marshall, J., dissenting)(Brady duty defined “not by reference to the 
possible usefulness of the particular evidence in preparing and presenting the case, but retrospectively by 
reference to likely effect the evidence will have on the outcome of the trial”). See United States v. Coppa, 
267 F.3d at142: 
The result of the progression from Brady to Agurs and Bagley is that the nature of the prosecutor’s 
constitutional duty has shifted from (a) an evidentiary test of materiality that can be applied rather 
easily to any item of evidence (would this evidence have some tendency to undermine proof of 
guilt?) to (b)  a result-affecting test that obliges a prosecutor to make a prediction as to whether a 
reasonable probability will exist that the outcome would have been different if disclosure had been 
made. To put it another way, Bagley makes the extent of the disclosure required by Brady 
dependent on the anticipated remedy for violation of the obligation to disclose: the prosecutor 
must disclose evidence if, without such disclosure, a reasonable probability will exist that the 
outcome of a trial in which the evidence had been disclosed would have been different (emphasis 
in original)..  
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conclusion?124 Under this perverse standard of constitutional due process, a prosecutor is 
encouraged to play games,125 i.e., to “gamble” and “play the odds,”126 to “bury his head 
in the sand,”127 play “hide and seek” with the accused,128 and require the accused to 
undertake a “scavenger hunt” for hidden Brady clues.129 And further emboldening a 
prosecutor to evade Brady with impunity is the knowledge that the undisclosed evidence 
                                                 
124 Consider Professor Scott Sundby’s tongue-in-cheek  rumination about a hypothetical “ethical” 
prosecutor’s mental process in deciding whether a particular piece of evidence is material under Brady and 
therefore must be disclosed: 
This piece of evidence is so exculpatory in nature that it actually undermines my belief that a 
guilty verdict would be worthy of confidence. Under Brady, therefore, I need to turn this evidence 
over to the defense. Then, once I turn the evidence over and satisfy my constitutional obligation, I 
can resume my zealous efforts to obtain a guilty verdict that I have just concluded will not be 
worthy of confidence. 
See Scott E. Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional Mirages: The Tale of Brady v. Maryland, 33 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 643, 653 (2002).   
125 See Bennett L. Gershman, Litigating Brady v. Maryland: Games Prosecutors Play, 57 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 531 (2007). 
126 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 701 (Marshall, J., dissenting)(Brady standard of materiality “invites a prosecutor, 
whose interests are conflicting, to gamble, to play the odds, and to take a chance that evidence will later 
turn out not to have been potentially dispositive”). 
127 United States v. Giovannetti, 919 F.2d 1223, 1228 (7th Cir. 1990). See Gershman, supra note 125, at 551 
(“The prosecutor’s claim of ignorance as an excuse for compliance with Brady resembles a defendant’s 
claim of ignorance as an excuse to avoid criminal liability.”). But see David Luban, Contrived Ignorance, 
87 GEO. L. J. 957, 976 (1999)(“in legal ethics, unlike criminal law, there is no willful blindness doctrine”). 
128 Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 696 (2004)(“A rule thus declaring ‘prosecution may hide, defendant 
must seek,’ is not tenable in a system constitutionally bound to accord defendant due process.”). 
129 Id. at 695 (“Our decisions lend no support to the notion  that defendants must scavenge for hints of 
undisclosed Brady material when the prosecution represents that all such material has been disclosed.”). 
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probably will remain hidden forever,130 and that even if the evidence ever does surface, 
the obstacles to a defendant successfully using it are daunting.131 
Thus, given a prosecutor’s predisposition and incentives to evade Brady, it should 
come as no surprise that Brady violations are serious, pervasive, and rarely subject to 
sanctions of any kind. Indeed, given the ease with which Brady evidence may be 
concealed and remain hidden,132 one may surmise that the documented violations 
probably represent only a fraction of the total number of Brady violations. Moreover, 
since no records or statistics are kept by courts, prosecutor offices, or other government 
agencies of the incidence of prosecutorial misconduct, the effort to document misconduct 
is difficult to measure accurately. Nevertheless, there exists a large and growing body of 
empirical and anecdotal evidence suggesting that Brady violations are the most common 
type of prosecutorial misconduct,133 often occurring in the same prosecutor’s office,134 
                                                 
130 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 443-444 (White, J., concurring)(“The judicial process will by definition be ignorant 
of the violation when it occurs; and it is reasonable to suspect that most such violations never surface.”); 
United States v. Alvarez, 86 F.3d 901, 905 (9th Cir. 1996)(“the government’s failure to turn over 
exculpatory information in its possession is unlikely to be discovered and thus largely unreviewable”); 
United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298, 1310 (3d Cir. 1984)(“[W]e are left with the nagging concern that 
material favorable to the defense may never emerge from secret government files.”), vacated sub nom. 
United States v. Plfaumer, 473 U.S. 922 (1985)(mem.). See also Elizabeth Napier Dewar, A Fair Trial 
Remedy for Brady Violations, 115 YALE L. J. 1450, 1455 (2006)(“Defendants only rarely unearth 
suppressions”); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Perjury and False Testimony: Should the Difference Matter So 
Much?, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1537, 1579 (2000)(arguing that in most cases “withheld evidence will 
never see the light of day”); Bibas, supra note 106, at 142 (“Because Brady material is hidden in 
prosecutors’ and police files, defense lawyers probably will never learn of its existence. Most defendants 
lack the investigative resources to dig up Brady material.”).  
131 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009)(imposing stringent pleading requirements imposing on 
plaintiff need to show that claim is facially plausible and contains sufficient factual content that allows 
court to draw reasonable inference that defendant is liable for misconduct). 
132 See supra notes 122-131, and accompanying text. 
133 See John F. Terzano & Alanna D. Holt, Improving Prosecutorial Accountability – A Policy Review, The 
Justice project (2009), at 9 (“Suppression of exculpatory evidence is the most widespread and common 
form of prosecutorial misconduct.”).  
134 See Steve Weinberg, Breaking the Rules: Who Suffers When a Prosecutor is Cited  for Misconduct? 
THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, 2003, at 3-4 (analyzing 11,451 cases since 1970 in which 
charges of prosecutorial misconduct were reviewed by appellate courts and found that in many instances 
the misconduct occurred in the same office, often by the same prosecutor); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful 
Convictions: It is Time to take Prosecution Discipline Seriously, 8 U.D.C. L. REV. 275, 281-282 
(2004)(noting seventy-two reported cases of prosecutorial misconduct from the Bronx district Attorney’s 
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often committed by the same prosecutor,135 and that appear to occur disproportionately in 
capital cases.136 And, tragically, Brady violations have been a principal cause of 
convictions of innocent persons.137  
The documentation of widespread violations of Brady is striking. A 1999 national 
study by the Chicago Tribune of 11,000 homicide convictions between 1963 and 1999 
found that 381 of these convictions were reversed for Brady violations.138 Sixty-seven of 
these defendants had been sentenced to death,139 many of whom were subsequently 
exonerated.140 A 2003 report by the Center for Public Integrity analyzed 11,452 post-
1970 convictions that appellate courts reviewed for prosecutorial misconduct, and which 
found reversible misconduct in 2,012 cases, the majority of them for Brady violations.141 
A 2000 study by Columbia Law School of error rates in capital cases found that apart 
from errors relating to incompetent counsel, the most frequent basis for reversible error in 
                                                                                                                                                 
Office between 1975-1996, eighteen of which involved reversals of convictions based on prosecutorial 
suppression of exculpatory evidence).  
135 See Weinberg, supra note  , at 3 (study finds many “recidivist prosecutors” around the country had “bent 
or broken the rules multiple times”). 
136 See JAMES LIEBMAN, JEFFREY FAGAN & VALERIE WEST, A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR 
RATES IN CAPITAL CASES, 1973-1995, at 5 (noting that prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory 
evidence accounted for 16%% to 19% of reversible errors);  Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, 
Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN, L. REV. 21, 23-24, 57 (1987)(finding that 
thirty-five of 350 wrongful capital convictions resulted from prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory 
evidence). Most of the post-Brady decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court addressing a prosecutor’s 
nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence occurred in capital cases. 
137 See Weinberg, supra note 134 at 2 (noting that in 28 cases involving 32 defendants, misconduct by 
prosecutors, including suppression of exculpatory evidence, led to the conviction of innocent persons); 
United States v. Jones, 620 F. Supp.2d 163, 170 (D. Mass. 2009)(noting that ‘in response to a disturbing 
number of wrongful convictions resulting in death sentences, in 2002 the Illinois Commission on Capital 
Punishment recommended that the Illinois Supreme Court ‘adopt a rule defining ‘exculpatory evidence’ in 
order to provide guidance to counsel in making appropriate disclosures.”); Bennett L. Gershman, 
Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REV.685, 688 n. 18 (2006)(listing several cases in which 
a prosecutor’s suppression of exculpatory evidence led to the conviction of innocent persons).   
138 Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley,  The Verdict: Dishonor, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Jan. 10, 1999, at 3. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. Six months after the Chicago Tribune series was published, several more people convicted of murder 
received new trials based on a finding that prosecutors failed to disclose evidence favorable to the defense. 
See Maurice Possley and Ken Armstrong, Historic Case Sent Ripples Through Legal Community, 
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, June 6, 1999, at 1. 
141 See supra note 134, at 2.  
 25
capital cases was attributable to Brady violations.142A report by the California 
Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice examined 2,130 state cases over a ten-
year period ending in 2006 in which claims of prosecutorial misconduct were raised.143 
Misconduct was found in 443 of these cases, or 21%. Violations of Brady were one of the 
most common forms of misconduct. An examination by the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette in 
1998 of over 1,500 cases found that Brady violations were pervasive and that courts 
hardly ever reversed convictions.144  
In addition to these empirical studies, the widespread incidence of Brady 
violations is also a matter of increasing concern to the courts. Dozens of cases in the 
federal courts since 2007 have found serious Brady violations.145 In an extraordinary 
                                                 
142 See supra note 136 at 5.  
143 See CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON THE FAIR ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, Report and 
Recommendations on Reporting Misconduct, Oct. 18, 2007, at 3 (“The most common forms of misconduct 
found were failing to disclose exculpatory evidence and improper argument.”). 
144 See Bill Moushey, Win at All Costs, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 24, 1998 (study of over 
1,500 cases nationwide during past decade found hundreds of cases in which prosecutors intentionally 
concealed exculpatory evidence). 
145  For recent cases in the U.S. Supreme Court involving Brady violations, see Cone v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 
1769 (2009)(remanded for hearing into prosecutor’s suppression of evidence regarding seriousness of 
defendant’s drug problem); Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867 (2006)(suppression of evidence 
indicating that testimony of key witness was false).  
For recent Brady cases (not an exhaustive list) in  which the Circuit Courts of Appeal granted 
relief, or criticized prosecutors for nondisclosures, see United States v. Robinson, 583 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 
2009)(nondisclosure of mental health records of confidential informant requires vacating conviction); 
Simmons v. Beard, 581 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 2009)(suppression ov evidence discrediting key witness violates 
due process); Montgomery v. Bagley, 581 F.3d 440 (6th Cir. 2009)(suppression of police report 
undermining credibility of key witness violates due process); United States v. Lee, 573 F.3d 155 (3d Cir. 
2009)(nondisclosure of back of hotel registration card suggesting defendant had registered in hotel required 
vacating conviction); United States v. Burke, 571 F.3d 1048 (10th Cir. 2009)(court greatly concerned that 
prosecutor’s belated disclosure “encourages gamesmanship” and “creates dangerous incentives [to 
misconduct]” but defendant did not show material prejudice);  United States v. Torres, 569 F.3d 1277 (10th 
Cir. 2009)(nondisclosure that confidential informant had been retained by government on two previous 
occasions required vacating conviction); United States v. Price, 566 F.3d 900 (9th Cir. 2009)(nondisclosure 
of extensive criminal history of key government witness requires vacating conviction); Douglas v. 
Workman, 560 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. 2009)(suppression of deal with key witness violates due process); 
United States v. Mauskar, 557 F.3d 219, 232 (5th Cir. 2009)(court “deeply concerned” at prosecutor’s 
belated disclosure of key evidence and at prosecutor’s justification which is “beneath a member of the Bar 
representing the United States before this Court” but defendant failed to prove prejudice); ); United States 
v. Gibson, 328 Fed. Appx. 860 (4th Cir. 2009)(new trial ordered on some counts based on prosecutor’s 
discovery violation); Harris v. Lafler, 553 F.3d 1028 (6th Cir. 2009)(suppression of evidence that key 
witness promised substantial benefits for his testimony); United States v. Triumph Capital Group, Inc., 544 
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decision last May in United States v. Jones,146 United States District Judge Mark L. Wolf 
castigated the federal prosecutor for her “egregious” Brady violation, stating that “this 
case extends a dismal history of intentional and inadvertent violations of the 
government’s duties to disclose in cases assigned to this court.”147 Judge Wolf appended 
Appeals and Federal District Courts in which the courts vacated convictions for serious 
                                                                                                                                                 
F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2008)((new trial ordered based on prosecutor’s “inexplicably withholding” material 
exculpatory and impeachment evidence); United States v. Aviles-Colon, 536 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 
2008)(nondisclosure of DEA reports materially prejudicial and new trial ordered); Unite States v. Lopez, 
534 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2008)(prosecutor’s Brady violation “troubling” but motion for new trial denied); 
D’Ambrosio v. Bagley, 527 F.3d 489 (6th Cir. 2008)(suppression of several items of exculpatory evidence 
that substantially contradicts testimony of state’s only eyewitness);  United States v. Rittweger, 524 F.3d 
171, 180 (2d Cir. 2008)(Sotomayor, J.)(court “troubled” and “disappointed” by prosecutor’s belated 
disclosure of exculpatory evidence and prosecutor’s argument that evidence not material disingenous but 
defendant failed to shop prejudice0; United States v. Chapman, 524 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2008)(prosecutor’s 
“unconscionable,” “willful,” and “bad faith” violation of discovery obligations and “flagrant” 
misrepresentations to court justified mistrial United States v. Zomber, 299 Fed. Appx. 130 (3d Cir. 
2008)(prosecutor’s discovery violation requires reversal of conviction and new trial); United States v. 
Garcia, 271 Fed. Appx. 347 (4th Cir. 2008)(prosecutor’s failure to disclose key impeachment evidence not 
prejudicial because defendant’s counsel uncovered information day before witness testified); United States 
v. Butler, 275 Fed. Appx. 816 (11th Cir. 2008)(suppression of impeachment evidence but no new trial); 
United States v. White, 492 F.3d 380 (6th Cir. 2007)(remanded for hearing on Brady violation but court 
observes that given conflicting statements, “United States Attorney’s word is worth considerably less”); 
Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2008)(suppression of evidence of cooperation agreement with 
key witness); United States v. Jernigan, 492 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2007)(en banc)(prosecutor suppresses 
evidence that other similar bank robberies were committed by someone after defendant’s arrest who bore 
striking resemblance to defendant); United States v. garner, 507 F.3d 399 (6th Cir. 2007)(belated disclosure 
of evidence used to impeach government’s key witness violates due process); United States v. Velarde, 485 
F.3d 553 (10th Cir. 2007)(suppression of evidence undermining credibility of key witness violates due 
process); United States v. Rodriguez, 496 F.3d 221 (2d Cir. 2007)(remanded for Brady hearing after 
prosecution witness admits lies in initial interviews and prosecutor seeks to avoid disclosure by not taking 
notes); Trammel v. McKune, 485 F.3d 546 (10th Cir. 2007)(in theft prosecution, suppression of receipts 
linking third party to theft violated due process); United States v. Chases, 230 Fed. Appx. 761 (9th Cir. 
2007)(no reversal but court admonishes prosecution for “shocking sloppiness” in carrying out its disclosure 
duty); Ferrara v. United States, 456 F.3d 278 (1st Cir. 2006)(nondisclosure of recantation by key 
government witness was “blatant” and “so outrageous” as to undermine defendant’s guilty plea); United 
States v. Risha, 445 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2006)(suppression of evidence discrediting testimony of key witness 
violates due process).  
For recent cases in the district courts (not an exhaustive list) where relief was granted based on 
Brady violations, see United states v. Shaygan, 2009 WL 989289 (S.D. Fla. 2009); United States v. 
Stevens, Cr. No., 08-231 (D.D.C. April 7, 2009)Docket No. 372); United States v. Jones, 620 F. Supp.2d 
163 (D. Mass. 2009); United States v. Fitzgerald, 615 F. Supp.2d 1156 (S.D. Cal. 2009); Cardoso v. United 
States, 642 F. Supp.2d 251 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Hernandez v. City of El Paso, 2009 WL 2096272 (W.D. 
Tex.); United States v. Quinn, 537 F. Supp.2d 99 (D.D.C. 2008); United States  United States v. Freeman, 
2009 WL 2748483 (N.D.Ill.)(prosecutor’s misconduct in allowing witness’s false testimony to materially 
prejudice defendants requires new trial); Sykes v. United States, 897 A.2d 769 (D.C. App. 2006).  
146 620 F. Supp.2d 163 (D. Mass. 2009).     
147 Id. at 165. 
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Brady violations.148  And in two recent highly-publicized prosecutions – the Duke 
Lacrosse case and the federal trial of then-Senator Ted Stevens – Brady violations were 
discovered that were so serious as to result in the conviction of criminal contempt and 
disbarment of the Duke prosecutor, Michael Nifong,149 and the federal district court’s 
vacating of Stevens’ conviction, dismissing the charges, the commencing criminal 
contempt proceedings against six prosecutors for obstruction of justice.150  What is so 
disconcerting about the misconduct by the prosecutors in the Duke lacrosse and Stevens 
cases is the realization that if a prosecutor is willing to violate Brady in a case of such 
high public visibility and media scrutiny, how much more likely is it that a prosecutor 
will violate Brady with impunity in the thousands of cases involving anonymous and 
invisible defendants? 
                                ************************ 
 
Imbler failed to appreciate the uniqueness of the Brady rule, the mindset of 
prosecutors that invites them to hide exculpatory evidence, and the ease with which 
prosecutors are able to violate Brady. Imbler worried that a civil action against a 
prosecutor would dampen the prosecutor’s “courage,” “independence,” and “energy,”151 
and that an “honest” prosecutor would have greater difficulty in defending himself from 
“error” and “mistaken judgment” than other officials cloaked with qualified immunity.152 
To be sure, although Pachtman was accused of Brady violations, the Court appeared to 
                                                 
148 Id. at 185-193. 
149 See Duff Wilson, Hearing Ends in Disbarment For Prosecutor in Duke Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 
2007, at 21; Shaila Dewan, DukeProsecutorJailed; Students Seek Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2007. 
See North Carolina State Bar v. Michael B. Nifong, No. 06 DHC 35 (June 16, 2007). 
150 See United States v. Stevens, Cr. No. 08-231 (D.D.C. April 7, 2009)(Motion Hearing)(Docket No. 372). 
(district court appoints special prosecutor to investigate and prosecute the matter). Id. at p. 46-47. 
151 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 424-425.  
152 Id. at 425. 
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view his conduct at most as an error, a mistake of judgment, or negligent rather than as 
willful misconduct. And given the record in that case, it is neither surprising nor counter-
intuitive that Imbler chose to minimize the need for a civil remedy with respect to a 
prosecutor’s conduct generally, and with respect to a prosecutor’s Brady violations in 
particular. It is also noteworthy that the Court focused on the prosecutor’s conduct in 
open court, and the advocacy decisions that a prosecutor makes before and during a trial 
that are subject to judicial review. The Court lumped together all of the conduct of a 
prosecutor  that is related to the trial, apparently including all actions undertaken before 
trial, in secret, shielded from public scrutiny, and not subject to judicial oversight, such as 
Brady decisions. To the extent that the Court assumed that a prosecutor’s duty under 
Brady to disclose evidence is undertaken as an “advocate” rather than as a “minister of 
justice,” the Court lost sight of the special responsibilities assigned to the prosecutor by 
Brady. And, by removing the sanction of civil liability from such misconduct, Imbler 
gave prosecutors a further incentive to disregard their constitutional responsibilities. 
  
IV. Lack of Accountability for Brady Violations 
 Imbler acknowledged that the immunity it created left a wronged defendant 
without a civil remedy.153 However, the Court added, this absence “does not leave the 
public powerless to deter misconduct or to punish that which occurs.”154 According to 
Imbler, the policy considerations that mandate civil immunity for prosecutors do not 
place prosecutors beyond the reach of the criminal law, suggesting that prosecutors 
                                                 
153 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427 (“To be sure, this immunity does leave the genuinely wronged defendant 
without civil redress against a prosecutor whose malicious or dishonest action deprives him of liberty.”).   
154 Id. at 429. 
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would be subject to criminal prosecution for willful acts that violate the criminal law.155 
Imbler also observed that a prosecutor who “stands perhaps unique, among officials 
whose acts could deprive persons of constitutional rights,” would be subject to 
professional discipline by bar associations.156 “These checks,” Imbler asserted, 
“undermine the argument that the imposition of civil liability is the only way to insure 
that prosecutors are mindful of the constitutional rights of persons accused of crime.”157 
 Imbler’s confidence that prosecutors would face both criminal and professional 
sanctions for their misconduct has proved to be dramatically mistaken. Indeed, one of the 
central themes in criminal procedure and professional ethics since Imbler has been the 
lack of accountability of prosecutors for their misconduct, and especially for their 
misconduct that involves the deliberate suppression of exculpatory evidence.158 As noted 
                                                 
155 Id. (“This Court has never suggested that the policy considerations which compel civil immunity for 
certain governmental officials also place them beyond the reach of the criminal law. Even judges, cloaked 
with absolute civil immunity for centuries, could be punished criminally for willful deprivations of 
constitutional rights…The prosecutor would fare no better for his willful acts.”). 
156 Id. (suggesting that a prosecutor is “perhaps unique…in his amenability to professional discipline by an 
association of his peers”).  
157 Id. 
158 See John F. Terzano & Alanna Holt, Improving Prosecutorial Accountability – A Policy Review, The 
Justice Project (2009)(describing prevalence of prosecutorial misconduct, absence of significant restraints 
on misconduct, and recommending ways to improve accountability); Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional 
Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C.L. REV. 721, 756-762, 774 (2001)(noting rarity of discipline against 
prosecutors); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It is Time to Take Prosecution Discipline 
Seriously,8 D.C.L. REV. 275, 277 (2004)(professional discipline for prosecutor’s misconduct “is often 
nil”); Kenneth Rosenthal , Prosecutor Misconduct, Convictions, and Double Jeopardy: Case Studies in an 
Emerging Jurisprudence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 887, 889 (1998)(“[T]here is a notable absence of disciplinary 
sanctions against prosecutors, even in the most egregious cases.”); Bruce A. Green Prosecutorial Ethics as 
Usual, 2003 U.ILL. L. REV. 1573, 1596 (2003)(noting that existing rules of ethics fail to regulate large 
areas of prosecutors’ professional conduct); Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors 
for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C.L. REV. 693, 697 (1987)(“[D]isciplinary charges have been 
brought infrequently and meaningful sanctions [have been] rarely applied.”);   Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong 
Without a Remedy: The Effective Enforcement of the Duty of Prosecutors to Disclose Exculpatory 
Evidence, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 833, 898 (1997)(noting that disciplinary process “has been almost 
totally ineffective in sanctioning even egregious Brady violations”); Angela J. Davis, The Legal 
profession’s Failure to Discipline Unethical Prosecutors, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 275, 282 
(2007)(describing disciplinary process as “woefully inadequate in holding prosecutors accountable for 
misconduct”). See also Armstrong & Possely, supra note 110 (1999 study of 381 cases in which courts 
dismissed homicide convictions based on Brady violations revealed that not one prosecutor was publicly 
sanctioned by a state disciplinary authority or criminally prosecuted for withholding evidence or presenting 
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above,159 a significant body of empirical and anecdotal evidence demonstrates that Brady 
violations are becoming the norm rather than the exception. Yet paradoxically, despite 
this systemic malfunction, there also appears to be a systemic inability to fix the problem. 
 Imbler’s expectation that prosecutors who violate the law would face criminal 
penalties seemed extreme at the time, and the prospect seems even more farfetched today. 
To support its view of the likelihood of criminal prosecutions against prosecutors, Imbler 
cited a California case, In re Branch,160 and stated: “California also appears to provide 
for criminal punishment of a prosecutor who commits some of the acts ascribed
respondent by petitioner.”
 to 
                                                                                                                                                
161  The Court’s extrapolation of a general principle from a case 
 
false evidence); Center for Public Integrity, supra note 134, at 79 (finding only forty-four cases of 
professional discipline of prosecutors out of 2,012 cases reversed since 1970 due to misconduct; of the 44 
cases, seven resulted in dismissal of the complaint, 20 in a reprimand or censure, 12 in a suspended license, 
two in disbarment, 24 in a fine, and 3 in remand for further proceedings); Mike Zapler, State Bar Ignores 
Errant Lawyers, San Jose Mercury News, Feb. 12, 2006, at 1 (finding that of 1,464 lawyer discipline cases 
published in the California Bar Journal between 2001 and 2005, only one case involved disciplinary action 
against a prosecutor for misconduct). 
Professional Discipline by the U.S. Justice Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility 
(OPR) also has been criticized as inadequate. See DAVID BURNHAM, ABOVE THE LAW: SECRET 
DEALS, POLITICAL FIXES AND OTHER MISADVENTURES OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE, 331 (1996)(“The systemic failure of this tiny, extremely passive unit to confront  directly the 
misconduct of Justice Department officials must be considered one of the most serious lapses in the 
department’s recent history.”); Greg Rushford, Watching the Watchdog: Veteran Justice Department Ethics 
Officer Faces Questions About His Own Actions, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 5, 1990, at 1 (criticizing 
effectiveness of Office of Professional Responsibility). See also United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 
522 (1983)(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)(“Prior experience, for example, might 
have demonstrated the futility of relying on Department of Justice disciplinary proceedings.”); Fred C. 
Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions: A Thought Experiment in the 
Regulation of Prosecutors, 89 B.U.L. REV. 1, 16 n. 75 (2009)(noting that OPR oversight of federal 
prosecutors is “uncertain”). In the aftermath of his dismissal of the conviction of then-Senator Ted Stevens 
of Alaska based on the prosecutors’ withholding exculpatory evidence, Federal District Judge Emmet G. 
Sullivan appointed a special prosecutor to investigate whether the six Justice Department prosecutors 
should face criminal charges for their misconduct. The judge expressed little confidence that the Office of 
Professional Responsibility would conduct a proper and effective inquiry. See United States v. Stevens, Cr. 
08-231 (hearing, Apr. 7, 2009) Docket No. 372, at 45-46 (expressing obvious lack of confidence in OPR’s 
claim, made six months earlier, to conduct an investigation, and that to date, “the silence is deafening;” 
court also expresses “shock but not surprise” at lack of response by then-U.S. Attorney General Michael 
Mukasey to numerous letters from defense counsel urging commencement of formal investigation of 
prosecutors). 
159 See supra notes 133-150, and accompanying text. 
160 449 P.2d 174 (Cal. 1969). 
161 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 429 n. 29. The Court’s reference to Branch is perplexing, and somewhat 
disingenuous. Branch reviewed a habeas petition by a California inmate convicted of possessing deadly 
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that does not even support that principle,162 was illogical then, and is even more 
unsupportable today. In fact, criminal sanctions against a prosecutor have hardly ever 
been enforced, either in California, or anywhere else in the United States.163 An extensive 
search through the internet has located not a single instance in California since Imbler in 
which a prosecutor has been criminally prosecuted for acts related to his prosecutorial 
duties.164 A nationwide search for instances of criminal charges against prosecutors in the 
last twenty-five years has turned up two criminal prosecutions stemming from highly-
publicized criminal cases in which prosecutors were charged with crimes related to their 
deliberate violations of Brady. In 1999 in Chicago, county prosecutor Thomas L. Knight 
was charged by a special prosecutor with obstruction of justice, perjury, and conspiracy 
for his suppression of “obviously exculpatory” evidence that put an innocent man on 
death row in the murder of a 10-year-old girl.165 Knight was acquitted. In 2007 in Detroit, 
                                                                                                                                                 
weapons in his cell, who claimed that his attorney failed to conduct an adequate investigation that other 
prisoners had committed the same offense. The attorney at a hearing stated that he refused to act upon the 
petitioner’s request because he had good reason to believe that the proposed testimony would be perjured.  
The appellate court noted that “an attorney may not knowingly allow a witness to testify falsely,” and that 
”an attorney who attempts to benefit his client through the use of perjured testimony may be subject to 
criminal prosecution.” Id. at 210. Thus, Branch did not involve the prosecution of a prosecutor, as the 
Court’s citation would lead one to believe, nor did Branch suggest that a prosecutor would be subject to 
criminal charges, or that any prosecutor had ever been prosecuted in California for suborning perjury. 
Indeed, of the many hundreds of reported cases in California and the U.S. in which prosecutors have been 
found to have knowingly elicited false testimony, not one of those prosecutors as far as I have been able to 
determine has ever been subjected to criminal prosecution for suborning perjury.  
162 Id.. 
163 See Brink, supra note 12 at 27 (“leveling of criminal charges against a prosecutor for conduct occurring 
in the course of a prosecution is all but unheard of”); Andrew Smith, Brady Obligations, Criminal 
Sanctions, and Solutions in a New Era of Scrutiny, 61 VAND. L. REV. 19351969-1970 (2008)(arguing that 
prosecutors could be charged criminally with violating 18 U.S.C. § 242, the criminal analogue to § 1983, 
and noting one case in which a local prosecutor was convicted in federal court under § 242 for violating 
Brady). See Brophy v. Committee on Professional Standards, Third Judicial Department, 442 N.Y.S.2d 818 
(N.Y. App. 1981)(Brophy convicted of § 242 misdemeanor and sentenced to pay a fine of $500; in light of 
his contention that his violation was :”inadvertent,” and his previously unblemished record, court believed 
a censure would be an appropriate disciplinary sanction).   
164 It goes without saying that a criminal prosecution against a prosecutor for any reason, and especially for 
crimes related to his prosecutorial function, would be a newsworthy event. The failure to uncover a single 
instance of a criminal prosecution, while not dispositive, strongly supports the conclusion. 
165 See Andrew Bluth, Prosecutor and 4 Sheriff’s Deputies Are Acquitted of Wrongfully Accusing a Man of 
Murder, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1999, at A9. 
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federal prosecutor Richard Convertino was charged by the U.S. Department of Justice 
with conspiracy, obstruction of justice, and making false statements in connection with 
his suppression of evidence in a high-profile terrorism trial in 2003.166  Convertino was 
acquitted. Indeed, of the hundreds of cases involving Brady violations noted above,167 
many of which were intentional, egregious, and easily provable as an obstruction of 
justice, no criminal action was brought against the prosecutor even though the prosecutor 
in many of these cases caused the conviction and lengthy incarceration of an innocent 
person.168 If Imbler’s prediction was even remotely accurate, one might have expected to 
see criminal charges brought against at least some of those prosecutors. But this has not 
happened.  
 Imbler also confidently predicted that a prosecutor would be amenable to 
professional discipline by bar associations.169 But as with Imbler’s prediction of criminal 
prosecutions, the imposition of professional discipline against prosecutors has also been 
extraordinarily rare. Although state bar associations, grievance committees, and the 
Justice Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility have regulatory authority over 
prosecutors, and have the power to discipline prosecutors for violations of rules of 
professional ethics, virtually every commentator has criticized the absence of 
professional discipline of prosecutors, even in cases of obvious and easily provable 
violations, and even in cases in which a court has issued a stinging rebuke of the 
                                                 
166 See Terror Case Prosecutor Acquitted of Rigging Trial Jury: Convertino and Agent Didn’t Hide 
Evidence, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Nov. 1, 2007, at A1. 
167 See supra notes 134-150, and accompanying text. 
168 See, e.g., Center for Public Integrity, supra note 134 at 1 (finding that of the 2,012 cases in which courts 
reversed convictions based on prosecutorial misconduct since 1970, reversals often attributable to Brady 
violations, 32 of these individuals were found to be innocent); Gershman, supra note 137, at 688 n. 18 
(identifying several cases in which a prosecutor’s violation of Brady contributed to the conviction and 
incarceration of an innocent person).   
169 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 429. 
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prosecutor.170 The absence of professional discipline is particularly glaring in cases 
involving intentional Brady violations. Indeed, of all the ethical rules relating to a 
prosecutor’s professional conduct, the ethics rule governing a prosecutor’s suppression of 
evidence is the most explicit and easiest to enforce.171 Nonetheless, although one might 
reasonably expect that such conduct would be viewed by professional disciplinary bodies 
as unethical, and even dangerous, professional disciplinary bodies for a variety of reasons 
typically maintain a hands-off approach.172 Indeed, from an examination of the numerous 
instances of serious Brady violations noted above, very few of the offending prosecutors 
was ever subjected to professional discipline, or even investigated by disciplinary bodies. 
 Given this regulatory vacuum by professional disciplinary bodies, several lower 
courts have begun to take a much more aggressive stand against prosecutorial abuses in 
an effort to make prosecutors accountable for their misconduct. This is especially 
noticeable in cases where prosecutors have committed serious Brady violations. Thus, in 
United States v. Stevens, .which involved the high-profile prosecution and conviction of 
then-Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska, Federal District Emmet G. Sullivan dismissed the 
                                                 
170 See supra note 158, and accompanying text. 
171 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2004); MODEL CODE OF 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103(B) (2004); ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3-3.11(a)(1992), reprinted in PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS, RULES AND REGULATIONS 1146 (John S. Dzienkowski ed. 2001). 
See Cone v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1769, 1783 n. 15 (“Although the due process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, as interpreted by Brady, only mandates the disclosure of material evidence, the obligation to 
disclose evidence favorable to the defense may arise more broadly under a prosecutor’s ethical or statutory 
obligations.”); Kyles v. Whitely, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995)(noting that Brady “requires less of the 
prosecution than the ABA Standards”). 
172 See supra note 158, and accompanying text. Occasionally an offending prosecutor is punished by a 
disciplinary body, and the event often elicits media attention. See, e.g.,  Jeffrey Toobin, Killer Instincts: 
Did a Famous Prosecutor put the Wrong Man on Death Row, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 17, 2005, at 54 
(discussing a county prosecutor who was disbarred for deliberately presenting a witness’s false testimony 
in two death penalty trials); Duff Wilson, Hearing Ends in Disbarment For Prosecutor in Duke Case N.Y. 
TIMES, June 17, 2007, at 21 (discussing the case of District Attorney  Michael Nifong, prosecutor in Duke 
lacrosse case, who was disbarred, among other misconduct, for suppressing exculpatory evidence); Howard 
Mint, State Bar Judge Wants Santa Clara County Prosecutor Suspended, Feb. 11, 2009, at 1 (discussing 
Benjamin Field, a county prosecutor who was described in a newspaper series as a “repeat offender” and 
was brought before the State Bar of California for misconduct in multiple cases spanning a decade). 
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charges against the defendant with prejudice after finding that the prosecution had 
suppressed material exculpatory evidence.173 Judge Sullivan appointed a special counsel 
to investigate the conduct of the offending trial prosecutors and their supervisors in the 
Justice Department and to consider criminal contempt and obstruction of justice charges 
for violating the court’s order to turn over to the defense all material exculpatory 
evidence.174 Similarly, in United States v. Shaygan,175 after finding that the prosecution 
had violated Brady, Federal District Judge Alan S. Gold in Florida granted the defendant 
a monetary award under the Hyde Amendment of $601, 795,176 imposed individual 
sanctions against the two Assistant United States Attorneys, and ordered the United 
States Attorney to establish procedures` to improve the supervision of attorneys in the 
office. The conduct of the prosecutors, according to Judge Gold, raised “disturbing” and 
“troubling” questions about the “integrity of those who wield enormous power over the 
people they prosecute.”177 Judge Gold added that the U.S. Attorney General must create a 
                                                 
173 See United States v. Stevens, Cr. No. 08-231 (D.D.C. April 7, 2009)(Docket No. 372), at  3 (“In nearly 
25 years on the bench, I’ve never seen anything approaching the mishandling and misconduct that I’ve seen 
in this case.”).  
174 Id. 
175 2009 WL 980289 (S.D. Fla.). 
176 The Hyde Amendment was enacted by Congress in 1998 and is located in a statutory note to 18 U.S.C. § 
3006A. It provides in relevant part that courts may award attorney’s fees and other litigation expenses to 
prevailing criminal defendants “where the court finds that the position of the United States was vexatious, 
frivolous, or in bad faith, unless the court finds that special circumstances make the award unjust.” Pub. L. 
No. 105-119,111 Stat. 2440, 2519 (1997)(reprinted in 18 U.S.C. § 3006A. Since its enactment, “prevailing 
criminal defendants” have applied for Hyde fees in approximately 200 reported cases, and have been 
successful in less than 10% of the cases. Courts have struggled to define the operative terms. See United 
States v. Gilbert, 198 F.3d 193, 1298-1299 (11th Cir. 1999)(finding that “vexatious” means without 
probable cause or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith; “frivolous” means 
groundless and with little prospect of success brought primarily to embarrass or annoy the defendant; and 
“bad faith” is the conscious doing of wrong because of a dishonest purpose, a furtive design, or ill will, 
requiring more than bad judgment or negligence).  According to Judge Gold, “the position taken by 
[Assistant United States Attorney] Cronin the prosecution] in filing the superseding indictment, in initiating 
and pursuing the collateral investigation based on unfounded allegations; suppressing information about the 
roles of two key government witnesses as cooperating witnesses in the collateral investigation; and 
attempting to secure evidence from the collateral investigation that would have jeopardized the trial and 
severely prejudiced the defendant, constitute bad faith.” Shaygan, slip. op. at 29..   
177 Shaygan, slip op. at 2. 
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culture where a “’win-at-any-cost’ prosecution is not permitted,” and that courts must 
impose sanctions for substantial prosecutorial abuses in order to “make the risk of non-
compliance too costly.”178  
Finally, in United States v. Jones,179 Federal District Judge Mark L. Wolf in 
Massachusetts found that “[t]he egregious failure of the government to disclose plainly 
material exculpatory evidence in this case extends a dismal history of intentional and 
inadvertent violations of the government’s duties.”180 In a separate opinion addressing 
whether sanctions should be imposed,181 Judge Wolf stated that the conduct of the 
prosecutor “reflects a fundamentally flawed understanding of her obligations, or a 
reckless disregard of them, despite many years of experience as a prosecutor, substantial 
training by the Department of Justice, and an explanation of her obligations by this 
Court.”182 Judge Wolf warned that he would institute criminal contempt proceedings 
against offending prosecutors in future cases and would publicly name these prosecutors 
in published decisions.183 Finally, pointing to the repeated violations by prosecutors in 
his court, Judge Wolf expressed dismay that it could no longer rely on the Department 
Justice training programs, and therefore would arrange for its own training program to 
educate prosecutors on their discovery responsibilities in criminal cases.
of 
                                                
184  
 
178 Id. at 3 (“It is equally important that the courts of the United States must let it be known that, when 
substantial abuses occur, sanctions will be imposed to make the risk of non-compliance too costly.”). 
179 609 F. Supp.2d 113 (D. Mass. 2009). 
180 Id. at 119. 
181 United States v. Jones, 620 F. Supp.2d 163 (D. Mass. 2009). 
182 Id. at 167. 
183 See Adam M. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming: Naming Attorneys to Reduce Prosecutorial 
Misconduct, 42 U.C.DAVIS.L.REV. 1059 (2009). Commentators have proposed other remedies to improve 
prosecutorial accountability. See, e.g., Sonja B. Starr, Sentence Reduction as a Remedy for Prosecutorial 
Misconduct, 97 GEO. L. J. 1509 (2009); Tracy L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing 
Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct With Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851 (1995).  
184 Apparently the stinging rebukes by the federal district judges in Stevens, Shaygan, and Jones did not go 
unnoticed by the Department of Justice. On January 4, 2010, Deputy Attorney General David W. Ogden 
issued three memorandums to United States Attorneys, Department Prosecutors, and Heads of Department 
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In sum, Imbler believed that protecting the honest prosecutor from civil liability 
was the “lesser evil” than affording a civil remedy to a defendant wronged by a dishonest 
prosecutor.185 Nevertheless, the Court assured the public that it would not be unprotected 
because prosecutors who abused their power would be subject to criminal prosecution 
and professional discipline. Today, thirty-four years later, it is abundantly clear that 
Imbler’s assurance was misguided and mistaken. Indeed, the only effective sanction – 
enabling the injured party to sue the wrongdoer directly – was discarded. 
  
 
V. Bad Faith Exception to Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity for Brady Violations 
 The extension of Imbler to a prosecutor’s willful violation of Brady was an 
unjustified extension of absolute immunity thirty-four years ago, and appears much more 
unwarranted today. As I have already demonstrated, Imbler provides tenuous support for 
absolute immunity for prosecutors with respect to their misconduct in general. But in 
view of the widespread occurrences of Brady violations, and the lack of effective 
                                                                                                                                                 
Litigating Components providing guidance in handling criminal discovery. For Memorandum to 
Department Prosecutors, see http://www.justice.gov/dag/discovery-guidance.html. (“The guidance is 
intended to establish a methodical approach to consideration of discovery obligations that prosecutors 
should follow in every case to avoid lapses that can result in consequences adverse to the department’s 
pursuit of justice.”) The Memorandum to Department Prosecutors specifically provides guidance to the 
“prosecution team” on where to look for Brady evidence, what to review, how to conduct the evidence 
review, and the scope, timing, and form of disclosures. The guidance is intended to supplement the United 
States Attorneys Manual dealing with disclosure. See United States Attorneys Manual § 9-5.001. Guidance 
is also provided by a designated criminal discovery coordinator in their office, as well as a full-time 
discovery expert who will be detailed to Washington from the field. For Memorandum on Discovery 
Policies, see http://www.justice.gov/dag/dag-memo.html. For Memorandum for Heads of Department 
Litigating Components, see http://www.justice.gov/dag/dag-to-usas-component-heads.html.  
 
 
 
185 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427-428, The Court, citing Judge Learned Hand’s opinion in Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 
396, 404 (2d Cir. 1926), noted that “the answer must be found in a balance between the evils inevitable in 
either alternative [but] it has been thought better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers 
than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation.”). 
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sanctions to deter such misconduct, Imbler’s protection of prosecutors is even more 
unjustified. Imbler’s decision to protect prosecutors not only prevents a wronged person 
from redressing constitutional harms caused by dishonest prosecutors but also disserves 
the judicial process by undermining its integrity and fairness. 
 Given that Imbler is a longstanding precedent that has been repeatedly reaffirmed 
by the Court, it is unlikely that the Court will reconsider its decision to afford absolute 
immunity to prosecutors with respect to their advocacy functions generally. However, 
there are several compelling reasons that might persuade the Court, or Congress, to make 
an exception to absolute immunity when prosecutors willfully suppress material 
exculpatory evidence. Such an exception would appear to be much more acceptable today 
than when Imbler was decided. For one thing, the framework of §1983 litigation has 
changed dramatically since Imbler, especially with respect to the continuing need by 
prosecutors for absolute immunity. As the Court observed in Burns v. Reed,186 the 
qualified immunity standard is far more protective of officials today than it was when 
Imbler was decided; “[qualified immunity] provides ample protection to all but the 
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”187 The Court since Imbler 
“completely reformulated qualified immunity”188 by replacing the common law 
subjective standard with an objective standard that allows liability only where the official 
violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 
person would have known.”189 This change was specifically designed to protect the 
honest and conscientious official from the kinds of frivolous, harassing, and disruptive 
                                                 
186 500 U.S. 478, 494-495 (1991). 
187  
188 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987). 
189 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).  
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complaints that are made by disgruntled defendants, particularly as these complaints 
relate to a prosecutor’s judgment calls and discretionary decisions, about which Imbler 
was critically concerned.190 Moreover, the Court has further narrowed a prosecutor’s 
exposure to civil liability by foreclosing civil complaints entirely unless the defendant 
was successful in obtaining a dismissal or acquittal of the criminal charges, further 
undercutting the Court’s concern that prosecutors would be subjected to a constant flood 
of lawsuits that would drain their energy and attention.191 
 Additionally, one of the hallmarks of the Imbler jurisprudence has been an 
attempt by the Court to ensure parity in the treatment of officials engaged in the same 
functions.192 Thus, in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons,193 the Court observed that when a 
prosecutor performs investigative functions normally performed by police officials, and 
as to which functions the police would enjoy only qualified immunity, “it is neither 
appropriate nor justifiable that, for the same act, immunity should protect the one and not 
the other.”194  Ensuring parity also was addressed in Burns v. Reed,195 where the Court 
considered whether a prosecutor enjoyed absolute immunity for giving legal advice to the 
police, and concluded that “it is incongruous to allow prosecutors to be absolutely 
                                                 
190 See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)(change in qualified immunity “specifically designed to 
to avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on 
summary judgment”). See also David Rudovsky, Running in Place: The Paradox of Expanding Rights and 
Restricted Remedies, 2005 U.ILL. L. REV. 1199, 1216 (noting the developments in criminal litigation 
since Imbler” provide adequate protections for prosecutors without the need for absolute immunity”).   
191 See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-487 (1994)(holding that to recover damages under §1983, a 
defendant who alleges that he was unconstitutionally convicted or imprisoned “must prove that the 
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid 
by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s 
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus”). 
192 See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 288 (1993)(“one of the unquestioned goals of our § 1983 
immunity jurisprudence: ensuring parity in treatment among state actors engaged in identical 
functions”)(Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting). 
193 509 U.S. 259 (1993). 
194 Id. at 273, quoting Hampton v. Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 608 (7th Cir. 1973). 
195 500 U.S. 478 (1991). 
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immune from liability for giving advice to the police, but to allow police officers only 
qualified immunity for following that advice.”196 And in Van de Kamp v. Goldstein,197  
which considered a supervisory prosecutor’s immunity for the supervision and training of 
trial prosecutors, the Court emphasized the “practical anomalies” of affording a trial 
prosecutor absolute immunity for his intentional misconduct, but affording supervisors 
only qualified immunity for their negligence in training and supervising that 
prosecutor.198   
 The Court’s concern with parity would appear to apply equally to Brady 
violations. Thus, it is well-established that a prosecutor’s disclosure duty extends to 
evidence in the possession of the police, even if the prosecutor is unaware of that 
evidence because, according to Kyles v. Whitley,199  a prosecutor has “a duty to learn of 
any favorable evidence known to others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, 
including the police.”200  To be sure, for Brady purposes the police are considered an 
“arm of the prosecutor,”201 and as virtually every circuit has concluded, have a derivative 
duty under Brady to turn over to the prosecutor potentially exculpatory evidence.202 
                                                 
196 Id. at 495. 
197 129 S. Ct. 855 (2009). 
198 Id. at 863. 
199 514 U.S. 419 (1995).  
200 Id. at 437. 
201 See Walker v. Lockhart, 763 F.2d 942, 958 (8th Cir. 1985)(“Police are treated as an arm of the 
prosecutor for Brady purposes”).  
202 See Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 381 (6th Cir. 2009)(“virtually every other circuit has 
concluded either that the police share in the state’s obligations under Brady, or that the Constitution 
imposes on the police obligations analogous to those recognized in Brady”); Brady v. Dill, 187 F.3d 104, 
114 (1st Cir. 1999)(“a police officer sometimes may be liable [under § 1983] if he fails to apprise the 
prosecutor of a judicial officer of known exculpatory information”); Hart v. O’Brien, 127 F.3d 424, 446-
447 (5th Cir. 1997)(“[A] plaintiff states a section 1983 claim against a police officer who, after learning of 
‘patently exculpatory evidence,’ deliberately fails to disclose it to the prosecutor.”); McMillian v. Johnson, 
88 F.3d 1554, 1569 (11th Cir. 1996)(“Our case law clearly established that an accused’s due process rights 
are violated when the police conceal exculpatory or impeachment evidence”); Walker v. City of New York, 
974 F.2d 293, 299 (2d Cir. 1992)(“The police satisfy their obligations under Brady when they turn over 
exculpatory evidence to the prosecutor.”). 
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Thus, if the police hide exculpatory evidence from the prosecutor, they violate their 
Brady duty and are subject to civil liability under § 1983 for which violation they recei
at most only qualified immunity.
ve 
olice 
e prosecutor. 
                                                
203 Thus, just as it would be incongruous to afford 
prosecutors absolute immunity for engaging in investigative misconduct for which p
enjoy qualified immunity, and for giving bad advice to the police for which the police 
would receive qualified immunity if they mistakenly relied on that advice, it would seem 
just as incongruous to afford prosecutors absolute immunity for failing to disclose 
exculpatory evidence to the defendant but afford the police only qualified immunity for 
failing to turn that same evidence over to th
Finally, just as the Court has created exceptions for bad faith conduct by 
prosecutors that violate the constitutional rights of defendants, so too could the Court 
create an exception to absolute immunity for bad faith violations of Brady. To be sure, a 
violation of Brady does not require that a prosecutor act in bad faith. The Brady rule 
reflects a “no-fault” principle that focuses on “the character of the evidence, not the 
character of the prosecutor.”204  However, a bad faith exception to absolute immunity 
would focus squarely on the character of the prosecutor, as well as the nature of the 
evidence that was suppressed, and the harm caused by that suppression. Bad faith 
conduct would consist of a conscious decision by a prosecutor to conceal from the 
defendant materially favorable evidence with knowledge that this evidence would 
exculpate the accused or impeach the credibility of a key witness. Unquestionably, such 
bad faith conduct is unethical and dishonest. It manifests a conscious intention by a 
 
203 Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d at 377 (police officers receive only qualified immunity for 
violation of same legal norm underlying due process recognized in Brady); Geter v. Fortenberry, 882 F.2d 
167, 171 (5th Cir. 1989)(affirming denial of qualified immunity for police officer who failed to disclose 
exculpatory evidence).  
204 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976). 
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prosecutor to commit a fraud on the judicial process – to defraud the defendant of his 
right to a fair trial, the court of the assurance that its discovery orders have been complied 
with, and the jury of learning all of the facts that would materially assist its mission to 
arrive at the truth.205 Bad faith conduct embraces the quality of “moral turpitude” that 
subjects the conduct of all attorneys to professional discipline206 
 Creating an exception for bad faith conduct of prosecutors that violates 
constitutional rules is hardly a novel proposal. Such an exception has been recognized by 
the Court in several areas involving the constitutional rights of criminal defendants. For 
example, with respect to a prosecutor’s charging function, the Supreme Court has stated 
that so long as a prosecutor has probable cause to believe that an accused has committed 
a criminal offense, the decision whether or not to prosecute rests entirely in his 
discretion.207 However, the Court has created several exceptions when a prosecutor 
institutes charges in bad faith, such as selectively charging persons based on 
unconstitutional standards relating to race, religion, or other arbitrary classifications,208 
vindictively charging persons in retaliation for their exercising legal rights,209 and 
                                                 
205 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 8.4 (c)(professional misconduct for lawyer 
to “engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation”). 
206 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(3)(“A lawyer shall 
not…[e]ngage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude”). 
207 United Stte v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996)(“so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to 
believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, 
and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion”), quoting 
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). 
208 Id. (“the decision whether to prosecute may not be based on ‘an unjustifiable standard such as race, 
religion, or other arbitrary classification’”), quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456); Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886)(defendant alleges selective prosecution when he establishes that 
administration of criminal law was “directed so exclusively against a particular class of persons…with a 
mind so unequal and oppressive’” that the system of prosecution amounts to “a practical denial” of equal 
protection). 
209 See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974)(prosecutor engages in “vindictive” charging in 
violation of due process when he brings charges in retaliation for a defendant’s exercise of legal rights).. 
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bringing charges in order to harass a defendant.210 Further, the Court has also recognized 
a bad faith exception to the rule that allows prosecutors virtually unfettered discretion in 
deciding when to bring charges.211  Thus, when a prosecutor delays bringing charges 
against a defendant in order to gain a “tactical advantage” over the accused,212 due 
process may be invoked to bar prosecution.213  Moreover, although double jeopardy does 
not protect a defendant who seeks a mistrial from being retried, the Court has created an 
exception to this rule in order to prevent a prosecutor from subverting a defendant’s 
double jeopardy rights.214  Thus, when a prosecutor engages in bad faith conduct for the 
purpose of provoking a defendant into seeking a mistrial, the protection of double 
jeopardy may be invoked to prevent the prosecutor from retrying the defendant.215 
Finally, although the government’s loss or destruction of potentially exculpatory 
evidence does not by itself violate due process, the Court has created an exception for 
exculpatory evidence which was lost or destroyed by the prosecution in bad faith for the 
purpose of preventing its use by the defendant.216 
                                                 
210 See Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85 (1971)(federal injunctive relief warranted “in cases of proven 
harassment or prosecutions undertaken by state officials in bad faith without hope of obtaining a valid 
conviction”). 
211 See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971). 
212 Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 795; Marion, 404 U.S. at 324. 
213 This exception would be invoked when a prosecutor intentionally waits until exculpatory evidence is 
lost, or where the delay prevents the defendant from learning about a witness or being able to interview 
him. See, e.g., United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858 (1982)(defendant may establish due 
process violation by showing that prosecutor removed witness from U.S. deliberately in order to deprive 
the defense of opportunity to interview him). 
214 See United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611 (1976)(retrial barred where prosecutor engages in 
conduct that “is intended to provoke a mistrial or is “motivated by bad faith or undertaken to harass or 
prejudice” defendant); Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 676 (1982)(prosecutor’s bad faith conduct that 
bars retrial limited to situations where prosecutor’s conduct “is intended to ‘goad’ the defendant into 
moving for a mistrial”). 
215 Id. 
216 See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988)(due process violated if defendant shows that failure 
to preserve potentially useful evidence motivated by bad faith).  
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A bad faith exception to absolute immunity for a prosecutor’s deliberate 
suppression of exculpatory evidence is consistent with the Court’s adoption of other 
exceptions for bad faith conduct by prosecutors. As noted above, the bad faith 
suppression of exculpatory evidence by prosecutors is a matter of increasing concern to 
courts and commentators, has contributed to the convictions of innocent persons, and is 
not subject to meaningful sanctions that might deter such misconduct. A bad faith 
exception would be limited to conduct by prosecutors that is deliberately undertaken to 
deprive a defendant of materially favorable evidence, thereby depriving a defendant of a 
fair trial. A “Brady exception” to absolute immunity would effect only a modest inroad 
into the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity. But such an exception would make 
a significant contribution to the integrity of the judicial process, which was the rationale 
for the Imbler rule in the first place, and would make prosecutors accountable for their 
deliberate constitutional violations.    
 
Conclusion 
 Despite being built on questionable history and speculative policy, Imbler v. 
Pachtman has been the foundation for the well-established rule that affords prosecutors 
absolute immunity from civil liability for conduct that is integrally related to the judicial 
process. According to Imbler, and reaffirmed in subsequent decisions, the absolute 
immunity extends to a prosecutor’s deliberate concealment from the defense of 
exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland. This is so even though Imbler’s  
concern that absolute immunity is necessary to protect the integrity and fairness of the 
judicial process is inconsistent with affording absolute immunity for Brady violations. 
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 The judicial evolution of the Brady rule has made it easier for prosecutors to 
violate Brady, and the lack of an effective mechanism to sanction or deter violations 
invites a re-thinking of the wisdom in continuing to afford prosecutors the shield of 
absolute immunity for willful and serious Brady violations. Brady violations appear to be 
more common than ever, and as Justice White noted in his concurrence in Imbler, “the 
stakes are high.” Brady violations deny the defendant his right to a fair trial, undermine 
the integrity of the judicial process, and tarnish the public’s perception of the judicial 
process. 
 Consistent with other instances in which the Court has made exceptions to 
constitutional rules for bad faith conduct by prosecutors, this Article proposes an 
exception to a prosecutor’s absolute immunity for bad faith conduct that involves the 
deliberate suppression of exculpatory evidence. Such an exception would not interfere 
with the policy reasons of Imbler.  The exception would not apply to the honest and 
conscientious prosecutor who seeks to comply with Brady. Indeed, it probably would not 
apply to the prosecutor who has negligently overlooked or failed to appreciate the 
significance of potential Brady evidence. The exception would apply only to those 
prosecutors who could be proved to have suppressed evidence in bad faith intentionally 
to deprive the defendant of exculpatory evidence. The exception is limited. However, 
given the limited availability of other sanctions, such an exception would provide at the 
very least a meaningful remedy to individuals whose constitutional rights were violated, 
and who were wrongfully deprived of their liberty by a prosecutor’s unlawful conduct. 
